Over the past year, Metamorphosis outlets have produced nearly 1,000 fact-checks, including debunks of spin and manipulations expressed by participants in the creation of public policies, as well as assessments of the fulfillment of political parties’ pre-election promises.
Fact-checkers and all those advocating to preserve the integrity of information in the public sphere are marking April 2 today – the International Fact-Checking Day (#FactCheckingDay), which this year is overshadowed by wars that, as is well known, are no friends of facts and truth.
“Wars, which by their very nature blur, conceal, and distort truth and facts, have in recent times, as well as at present, been one of the main topics in the media. The war in Ukraine, following Russia’s aggression against its peace-loving neighbor, has now lasted for more than four years with no hope of a ceasefire. After last year’s airstrike on Iran, when nuclear facilities and research centers in the country were bombed during the summer by Israel and the United States, we are now witnessing an expanded replay, one that carries a serious risk of turning into a full-scale military invasion and has already spread across the entire region. The speed at which this conflict has expanded matches the speed at which disinformation stemming from it spreads. Simply put, the more countries and people are directly or indirectly affected by the military conflict, the more disinformation, manipulation, and half-truths begin to circulate in the public sphere,” notes Metamorphosis Foundation on the occasion of the International Fact-Checking Day.
The first International Fact-Checking Day was launched by the International Fact-Checking Network (IFCN) in 2016, with the aim of celebrating and highlighting the work of fact-checkers around the world, and it has been observed every year since. The International Fact-Checking Network began with just a dozen member organizations, and today it includes more than 180 organizations worldwide.
In North Macedonia, a full and certified member of this network since 2019 is the Metamorphosis Foundation together with the fact-checking portal Truthmeter.mk. Since 2023, Metamorphosis and Truthmeter.mk have also been certified members of the European Fact-Checking Standards Network (EFCSN), based in Brussels, Belgium, and other Metamorphosis outlets are actively involved in fact-checking as well, including the Meta.mk News Agency (meta.mk) and the Albanian-language news portal Portalb.mk.
Regarding the war against Ukraine, Metamorphosis team stresses that speed at which this conflict has expanded matches the speed at which disinformation stemming from it spreads. Simply put, the more countries and people are directly or indirectly affected by the military conflict, the more disinformation, manipulation, and half-truths begin to circulate in the public sphere.
“Unlike at the very beginning of the conflict, when there was noticeable misuse of visual materials such as photos and video clips from earlier conflicts, falsely presented as current in order to portray the other side as criminal, we are now witnessing entire disinformation narratives being pushed through constant and repetitive false claims. The aim is to reframe unfavorable news and information in the media and present events in a light benefiting those promoting such narratives to the public. This is often done by highly positioned state officials or influential circles, who are regularly cited by global media and whose disinformation efforts reach the wider public far more easily than fact-checkers do,” Metamorphosis team stated.
According to them, this is often done by highly positioned state officials or influential circles, who are regularly cited by global media and whose disinformation efforts reach the wider public far more easily than fact-checkers do. When it comes to disinformation and harmful Foreign Interference, Manipulation, and Information (FIMI) operations originating from the Kremlin, which in recent years have been a major challenge for fact-checkers, there has recently been a noticeable decline in intensity. However, existing disinformation narratives targeting Ukraine, the West and its institutions such as the EU and NATO, as well as the glorification of Russia and Putin, still persists.
“Besides wars, another serious challenge for fact-checkers is the increased use of artificial intelligence to spread disinformation. Unlike the past two to three years, when AI-generated disinformation mainly came from abroad and was therefore easier to uncover, as we predicted, the use of AI in producing disinformation is increasingly domestic, or local. An explosion of such locally produced AI disinformation is expected in 2027-28,” the announcement concludes.
The fact-checkers add that an increasing number of photos, often used primarily to drive clicks or sell products, such as medicines, are coming from domestic users, and this trend is certain to continue. Online scams, particularly those spreading through social media, have recently experienced a kind of “mini-renaissance” with both the variety and frequency of scams on the rise.
This year, International Fact-Checking Day is being observed under the slogan “We Stand for Facts!” (#WeStandForFacts), and the International Fact-Checking Network will present its latest annual report on the state of fact-checking, the State of the Fact-Checkers Report.
The Rector of the University of Belgrade, Vladan Đokić, addressed citizens gathered in protest in front of the University headquarters from the balcony of the Rectorate building. On March 31, members of the Criminal Police entered the Rectorate building of the University of Belgrade without prior notice and without a clear legal justification, reports “Danas.rs.”
“[The raid took place] without respect for the autonomy of the oldest and most distinguished educational institution in Serbia. They seized computers and servers. They are searching offices. They are looking for documents. And while they were doing this, regime television broadcast it live. They did not come to investigate. They came to humiliate. They came to tell every professor, every student, every citizen: this is what happens to those who do not remain silent. Let us clearly state what happened today. A young woman died on Thursday. A tragedy that deserves a dignified, independent, and thorough investigation. The University of Belgrade immediately called for such an investigation. We offered full cooperation. Instead, we received a police raid in front of cameras. The Rectorate’s computers contain no information relevant to the investigation of the death of a student at the Faculty of Philosophy. Everyone knows this. But that is not the point. The point is the image: police in the Rectorate. The rector under investigation. The university on its knees,” Rector Đokić said.
In his speech, the Rector emphasized that the University of Belgrade fully respects the rule of law.
” We support every lawful investigation. But what happened today has nothing to do with an investigation. It has to do with intimidation. I repeat the call: we demand an independent investigation, and if necessary one under international supervision, into the circumstances of our student’s death. We demand forensic experts, not political operations. We demand truth, not punishment for those who seek it. To the international community: Today, police entered the University of Belgrade. This is being broadcast live as a political spectacle. This is not an investigation. This is a crackdown on freedom of thought. I call on universities across Europe, the European Commission, the European Parliament, and all who believe in academic freedom: to speak out. Today Belgrade. Tomorrow any other university in Europe that dares to stand with its students,” Đokić said in his speech.
Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić declared victory for the coalition gathered around the Serbian Progressive Party (SNS), stating that it won in all 10 local self-government units where regular local elections were held yesterday.
He said the closest races were in Kula, where the difference was 530 votes, and in Bor, where the alleged preliminary advantage of SNS is around 1,900 votes.
According to him, in Aranđelovac the SNS coalition currently has 52.96 percent, “Students for Aranđelovac” 44.9 percent, while other lists are below two percent. In Bajina Bašta, SNS allegedly has 53.49 percent, “United for Bajina Bašta” 41.35 percent, and others below two percent.
In Bor, SNS reportedly won 49.2 percent, the student list 40.3 percent, and the Vlach People’s Party 3.96 percent. In Kladovo, SNS has 71.98 percent, the opposition 26.69 percent, and others below two percent. In Knjaževac, SNS won 57.11 percent, while the two opposition lists received 32.9 and 8.9 percent.
In Kula, the race remained uncertain until the final polling station, where the SNS list won 50.52 percent (11,510 votes), while “Voice of the Youth of Kula Municipality” received about 48 percent (10,997 votes).
In Lučani, SNS reportedly won 63.78 percent (21 mandates), compared to 11 mandates for the opposition list. In Majdanpek, SNS has 65.64 percent, “Nu Dau” 19 percent, and Damjan Stevkić 13 percent.
In Sevojno, based on four out of five processed polling stations, SNS has 51.48 percent, students 44.84 percent, while “Healthy Serbia” may also pass the threshold. In Smederevska Palanka, SNS won 58 percent, the student list 29.22 percent, and the opposition 9.05 percent.
The election day was marked by serious irregularities and scenes of violence in three of the ten locations where voting took place. In Bor, Bajina Bašta, and Kula, independent journalists and observers reported parallel voter lists and organized attacks by masked groups, among whom officials of the ruling parties were allegedly identified. The situation is particularly dramatic due to the fact that the police largely did not intervene against the attackers.
“Today’s election day in Bor has been marked by a series of incidents of physical violence. The dynamics of the day are perhaps best illustrated by the fact that, for the first time in a place where I observe elections, I know where the hospital, the police station, and the court are located. For CRTA’s observation mission, the fact that the basic safety of observers, activists, and journalists is not guaranteed by the Ministry of Interior sends a very serious signal. What we are witnessing has no trace of free elections, let alone any shades of democracy today,” said Raša Nedeljkov, head of CRTA’s observation mission.
Serious irregularities in the local elections and scenes of violence were recorded today in three of the ten locations in Serbia where local elections are being held. In Bor, Bajina Bašta, and Kula, independent journalists and observers report parallel voter lists and organized attacks by masked thugs, among whom officials from the ruling parties were identified. The situation is particularly alarming due to the fact that the police largely did not intervene against the perpetrators of violence.
Voting also took place in Knjaževac, Sevojno, Kladovo, Smederevska Palanka, Aranđelovac, Lučani, and Majdanpek. One hour before the end of voting (8 p.m.), TV N1 reported high turnout in all locations, at around 60 percent.
“Today’s election day in Bor has been marked by a series of incidents of physical violence. The dynamics of the day are perhaps best illustrated by the fact that, for the first time in a place where I observe elections, I know where the hospital, the police station, and the court are located. For CRTA’s observation mission, the fact that the basic safety of observers, activists, and journalists is not guaranteed by the Ministry of Interior sends a very serious signal. What we are witnessing has no trace of free elections, let alone any shades of democracy today,” said Raša Nedeljkov, head of CRTA’s observation mission.
He noted that in most locations they recorded strict control over voting, as well as direct interference in the electoral process through lists of “secure votes of our president.”
In the town of Kula, CRTA’s observation mission documented an attack by a large group of masked “unknown individuals,” who, after emerging from the city stadium, injured several people using stones, metal bars, sticks, and flares. The injured, who sustained head injuries, sought assistance at the city hospital.
“The police reacted immediately but did not carry out an inspection nor enter the stadium. The unidentified individuals who carried out the attack are located inside the stadium,” said Pavle Dimitrijević, head of CRTA’s legal team.
A larger group of citizens then gathered at the scene, dissatisfied with the police response. Additional incidents were later reported throughout the town.
In Bajina Bašta, during the night, tires were punctured on vehicles belonging to observation missions, while during the day there were multiple incidents of street violence, including the destruction of a car. Footage from one of the incidents shows, in addition to attackers armed with batons, an unidentified man carrying a firearm.
In Bor, one of the beatings occurred after a large group of pro-government enforcers, referred to in Serbia as “ćaci” (also transliterated as “čaci” in Macedonian media), emerged from the premises of the Pension and Health Insurance Fund and beat up students.
In Bor, other citizens were also physically attacked, including journalists and a CRTA observer, whose mobile phones were taken during the incident.
Nedeljkov stated that “one police officer physically threatened with a weapon in an attempt to calm tensions, while the attackers said ‘we don’t care at all,’ insulted him, and attacked the young men and our observer.”
The portal Mašina published footage from Knjaževac showing police officers, who were informed by students that violence was taking place nearby, refusing to go to the scene and instead directing them to the police station.
In Kraljevo, the police prevented a larger group of citizens who had gathered in front of a building where masked attackers had fled after the initial assaults from confronting them.
TV Nova S reported that during one of the incidents in Bor, a citizen complained that police officers broke his arm while he was defending his son from pro-government attackers.
The civil organization CRTA today has observation missions in all 10 locations where local elections are being held, organized through mobile teams. The full composition of the missions includes 300 trained volunteer observers, while logistics and fuel costs are covered by individual donations from citizens.
Hundreds of citizens joined the March 8 protest march in Skopje today under the slogan “We Will Not Disappear.” According to the organizers, this year’s march was the largest held so far to mark International Women’s Day.
Participants carried banners with messages such as “Endure it, report it, die,” “Verdict: You are guilty of complicity in a crime,” “The abuser stays home while the victim seeks shelter?”, “Safe city, unsafe women,” and “Cameras watch, institutions look away.”
The march began with a minute of silence for Ivana and Katja, the mother and daughter who recently died after prolonged domestic violence by the husband and father, Stojanche Jovanovski.
Speakers at the event stressed that femicide does not begin with the final act of violence, but much earlier.
“Femicide begins long before the last blow. Domestic violence must be a priority for every institution. Yet we often hear perpetrators say with a smile, ‘She asked for it herself.’ How can institutions ask women to report violence if they later withdraw complaints or fail to act?” speakers said during the march.
Photo: Meta.mk
Participants also called for justice for Ivana, Katja, Rosica, and Ramajana.
During the speeches, some participants also booed Prime Minister Hristijan Mickoski and Interior Minister Panche Toshkovski.
The march started at Woman Fighter Park, continued through the Rekord area and past the Government building, and ended at the pedestal of Macedonian partisan Vera Jocić. Her statue was stolen in December last year and has not yet been replaced.
Participants laid flowers at the site in honor of the women fighters who dedicated their lives to women’s freedom.
The painful topic of systemic failures in the protection of women-victims of violence in North Macedonia, has once again been opened by the latest tragedy in which a mother and daughter lost their lives, after several reports of domestic violence by a violent and abusive husband. Despite the mother’s cries for help, the case remained without an appropriate institutional response. The death of the young mother and her daughter once again exposed the reality – when institutions do not react in time, violence ends in death.
In recent years, the statistics have become increasingly alarming. Femicides, rapes, attacks, threats, hatred, retaliation, stalking, blackmail, misogyny and sexism – are not isolated incidents, but the result of a way of life that dehumanizes women.
The latest tragedy, in which a mother and her 6-year-old daughter died as a result of domestic violence, occurred on the eve of March 8, International Women’s Day. The main message of the march which traditionally organized to mark the occasion is that women are not safe anywhere and that the fight for rights and the fight against femicide and violence against women must not remain merely symbolic.
“We exist on the margins of society and history. At constant risk of being erased, forgotten, killed. We do not remain silent, we do not accept, we do not reconcile. How many more women will disappear while institutions are silent supporters and instigators of violence? All competent institutions that have ignored, minimized, relativized, encouraged and allowed violence against women for years are guilty. The community that chooses to believe the perpetrators instead of the victims is also to blame. In this society, women are left alone to prove themselves, to protect themselves and run away and to seek help in vain. In this society, women are most unsafe precisely where they belong – at home. This society teaches men that they have supremacy, that women are their property and that they have the right to own, control and even take our lives. For years, we have been marching and fighting for dignity, freedom, security, prevention, protection and for a life without fear. This year too, we will march and, in defiance of the culture of violence, we will say – We will dissapear! There is no justification, no evasion, no forgetting. Let’s stand together against the bullies, the thugs, the murderers and the institutions,” the organizers of the march said.
A record 4,745 women reported domestic violence in 2025
A record 4,745 women reported domestic violence in 2025 in North Macedonia, according to figures from the Ministry of Interior (MoI), which include crimes, misdemeanors and complaints of domestic violence. Looking at the figures from the last five years, the situation is worrying. Wives are usually the most affected group, which raises the alarm for the introduction of enhanced measures for their protection and support.
Meta.mk recently wrote that violence against women in Macedonia is resurfacing with a series of worrying cases in just one day, reported a recent MoI daily bulletin. In Skopje and Delchevo, several women reported physical attacks, threats and psychological abuse by their partners or former partners. The police have acted on several reports of gender-based violence, which is further evidence that many women are exposed to danger behind the closed doors of their homes.
According to the Ministry of Interior, in a period of five years, as many as 26 femicide cases were recorded. In 2021, four criminal acts of “murder” were registered, in which the victims were four women. In 2022, two criminal acts of “murder” were registered, in which the victims were two women. The following year, this number was 9, including a murder of 14-year-old girl. In 2024, five women were killed, one of whom was a two-year-old girl, and last year, 6 women were killed.
We don’t have strong institutions to protect women victims
Ana Avramoska Nushkova from the National Network to End Violence against Women and Domestic Violence believes that the increased number of reports to the Ministry of Interior from female victims is due to the fact that this topic is increasingly being discussed publicly. Campaigns and more active media coverage mean that women now have better access to information about where to report violence and what their rights are.
However, she says that in practice women who report violence often withdraw their complaints, and those cases end up without legal consequences.
“In many cases, women withdraw their reports because of economic dependence, shared housing, as well as other patriarchal norms and gender stereotypes that still exist in our society, including pressure from the immediate family. With the recent amendments to the Criminal Code, the Public Prosecutor’s Office now prosecutes bodily harm ex officio, even if the victim withdraws the complaint. But it is crucial what the system can offer to protect the victim. We must have strong institutions and established, sustainable and geographically appropriately distributed specialized services, so that we can adequately protect the women who report they are victoms of violence,” she said.
However, in the latest case of domestic violence that resulted in the deaths of Ivana and Katja, these legal amendments were not applied. Police reportedly stopped the procedure after the victim signed a statement claiming she had not been physically assaulted by her husband.
In such an environment, March 8 is a reminder that institutional impunity and social tolerance of violence create the conditions for new tragedies. Femicide, rape, threats and stalking are not isolated incidents, but the consequence of a system that has ignored warnings for years and left women alone to fight for their own safety.
Women’s struggle is collective and men in this society must understand that
Marta Stevkovska, journalist, author, feminist and gender equality activist from the Stella network, says the women’s struggle is a collective one and that men must understand this as well.
“It is time for men to join the march, to also call for accountability, condemn violence and refuse to turn their heads away when violence happens. For me, March 8 is a day when we continue the struggle of the women before us, because we owe them the rights we have today. Unfortunately, the system forgets them and pushes them to the margins. Our duty is to celebrate them, march for our survival, and continue the fight. The latest tragedy in which a mother and child were ‘killed’ once again exposed the violent system that remains silent before abusers and criminals and fails to protect women,” she said.
Marta Stevkovska, journalist, author, feminist and gender equality activist from the Stella network. Photo: Žarko Čulić.
She added that hope for women in this society exists only if people act collectively and in solidarity, clearly stating that women must not be left marginalized and unprotected.
“It is time for the competent authorities to truly listen to us and protect us, to do their job as required by law. It is not enough to say ‘stop violence’ or to hold speeches encouraging reporting. Institutions must act and provide real support and assistance to victims. The community also bears responsibility when it normalizes violence and blames women based on stereotypes and prejudices, making it even harder for victims to report abuse,” Stevkovska said.
Gender disinformation causes significant harm
Alongside institutional weaknesses, the public space is increasingly flooded with gender-related disinformation that relativizes violence, fuels growing polarization between men and women, and distorts the concept of gender equality.
Recently, the Association for the Advancement of Journalistic Practices “Innovative Media” and the Media Diversity Institute – Western Balkans published an analysis titled “Mapping Gendered Disinformation in the Western Balkans.” The author is Despina Kovachevska, a media monitoring expert at the Metamorphosis Foundation. The spread of gender-related disinformation contributes to the broader problem of misinformation by distorting public understanding of gender equality and reinforcing harmful stereotypes.
“In 2021 and 2022, especially during the pandemic, disinformation campaigns were largely focused on pregnant women, spreading false claims that the COVID-19 vaccines would cause severe harm to their unborn children. This misinformation fueled fear and uncertainty, undermining public health efforts aimed at protecting both mothers and babies. After the pandemic, disinformation shifted towards anti-vaccination narratives, with claims that vaccines cause infertility in women.
In 2023 and 2024, the number of disinformation instances doubled, with a noticeable shift in the narrative aimed at discrediting women in politics. This trend became more prominent due to increasing attacks on female politicians, often focusing on their gender and perpetuating harmful stereotypes to undermine their credibility and leadership,” the analysis states.
Meanwhile, data from an OSCE-led survey on violence against women, conducted in 2019, point to a complex environment in which patriarchal norms remain strong and a significant portion of the population views domestic violence as a private family matter. This creates barriers for victims seeking help. Regarding perceptions of violence, 60 percent of women in North Macedonia believe that violence against women is “very” or “fairly” common in the country. According to the survey results, 13 percent of women aged 18 to 74 experienced physical, sexual, or psychological violence from a current or former partner within a single year.
The report also identifies specific barriers in North Macedonia that prevent women from leaving abusive situations or reporting them. Women expressed deep distrust toward social services and the police, fearing that their private information could leak into the community. One participant stated:
“There is nowhere you can hide. You go to the social services, and the officials there will gossip about you, and the whole town will find out about you. They will tell a friend, that friend will tell another friend, that friend will tell your husband, and he will come and beat you up”
Patriarchy as Tradition
If one looks at the participants in the March 8 protests over the years, as the organizers point out, the presence of women is drastically higher than that of men. According to them, this is not without reason. The most common reaction to these marches is the claim that “women already have all the same rights as men, so why are they protesting,” or that women gaining rights somehow means men are losing theirs.
Patriarchy, as a social system, grants certain privileges to men as a group while at the same time imposing and defining rigid gender norms on masculinity, how men should look and behave.
“It is important to note that acknowledging that men enjoy certain privileges should not be seen as a problem. At the same time, this does not mean that men do not face difficulties that society must also address. However, the feminist struggle — which should not be limited to a single date such as March 8 — works not toward individual solutions, but toward overcoming problems affecting society as a whole, including men. Through marches like these, the goal is to reject systems of domination based on gender, class, sexuality, disability and other marginalized identities. Because patriarchy is kept ‘alive’ through social structures and everyday behaviors in which men often hold greater power, men have not only the capacity but also the responsibility to oppose these systems. Their participation signals that gender equality is not a women’s issue, but a social and collective one,” activists say.
According to them, the presence of men at such events should encourage other men — those who are indifferent or openly antagonistic toward feminist movements — to understand, at the very least for personal reasons, that they too stand to benefit from joining the struggle.
“By opposing patriarchy, men also challenge the harmful behavioral patterns imposed on them and help ensure that aggressive behavior is condemned rather than ignored, or even worse, supported and defended,” they say, adding that joining the feminist movement is not an act of charity toward women, but a commitment to collective liberation.
Part of the History of the Struggle for Women’s Rights – Finland a Leader in Europe
Clara Zetkin and Rosa Luxemburg. Public domain photo via Wikimedia Commons.
International Women’s Day began to be widely celebrated or observed on March 8 from 1975, after the United Nations marked that year as International Women’s Year. Two years later, the UN General Assembly adopted a resolution declaring March 8 the International Day for Women’s Rights and International Peace.
However, the history of women’s struggle for equality with men is much older and can be traced back to the French Revolution and its principles, as well as to the socialist movements that emerged in the late 19th and early 20th centuries in the United States and Europe, which demanded equal workers’ rights, the right to vote, and other forms of equality.
Among the most prominent women who shaped the early history of the struggle for women’s rights are Theresa Malkiel (USA), Rosa Luxemburg, Clara Zetkin, and many others.
In ASNOM-era Macedonia, women’s voting rights and other rights were equalized immediately after World War II, when Macedonia became a constituent member of the Federal People’s Republic of Yugoslavia and later a member of the United Nations.
Written by: Antonija Popovska and Matej Trojachanec
On Sunday, in the center of Skopje, on the occasion of March 8 – International Women’s Day, the traditional march for women’s rights will be held. The march will start at 12:00 in the “Woman Fighter” park, and will end in front of the stolen bust of Vera Jocikj, as a sign of protest and resistance to the factual and figurative erasure of women in our society.
This year, the slogan of the march is “We will not disappear”, which expresses the unwavering and necessary struggle of women to survive in a system and society that threatens their safety, does not protect them from abusers, forgets them, leaves them on the margins and erases them.
“Women exist on the margins of society, as well as on the margins of history, under constant risk of being erased, forgotten, killed. Women’s work is often invisible, belittled, underpaid and appropriated. A woman who works part-time has no health, social or pension insurance, which further complicates her economic independence and directly affects the possibility of paid maternity leave. For every ten employed men, there are only seven employed women,” the march organizers point out.
They recall that last year was marked by five femicides and a record number of gender-based violence in the last five years, and this year the violence continued with a huge number of new cases where women, although they reported it, were again ignored. On top of all this, discrimination, attacks and general neglect towards pregnant women, farmers, workers, unemployed women continue…
The public space is increasingly filled with misinformation that relativizes and normalizes violence and distorts the notion of gender equality. Women pay for institutional failure and avoidance of responsibility with their health and life, ignored when they seek help and without receiving justice.
“In addition, society is becoming militarized, nationalist and fascist speech is intensifying, we are witnessing wars and ecological disasters, and women are paying out of their own pockets for the unprecedented greed of a few. This system of inequality and supremacy survives on the back of women’s freedom and labor. Therefore, on March 8, we call for a march together to say and show that we remember, record, continue to exist and fight. We are marching through the streets of our cities to say: “We will not disappear,”” the organizers say.
Information about the march can be found on social media Instagram and Facebook.
A mother and her daughter died after falling from a residential building in the Taftalidže neighborhood of the Skopje municipality of Karposh. The incident occurred in the afternoon, and the location was blocked for hours by police vans and ambulances.
The Ministry of Interior reported that the incident was reported at around 14:15, when police received information that a woman and a minor child had jumped from a balcony of the building. Their deaths were confirmed at the scene.
A public prosecutor on duty conducted an on-site inspection and ordered an autopsy of the bodies. The Public Prosecutor’s Office also instructed authorities to collect traces and other relevant evidence from the scene.
According to the Prosecutor’s Office, police are currently conducting interviews with several individuals who may have information about the circumstances and possible motives related to the incident.
Residents of the villages of Trnovo, Dobrovnica, Uzem, Krklja, Varovište, Drenje and Stanci yesterday held a peaceful protest in front of the Municipality of Kriva Palanka building, demanding a solution to the problem of the uncontrolled movement of large livestock. Mayor Saško Mitovski also attended the protest.
Citizens said they have been suffering for years from damage to crops, fields, yards and auxiliary buildings, and that their traffic safety is also at risk. Some of them claim they have been exposed to threats and pressure from the owners of the animals.
According to them, they have been facing the same problem for more than 15 years—uncontrolled movement of large livestock through the villages, fields, yards and auxiliary buildings. They are asking for a permanent solution that would protect both their property and the livestock.
One day before the protest, the Ministry of Interior detained a 27-year-old woman from the village of Židilovo because she prevented employees of the Food and Veterinary Agency (FVA) from carrying out official duties. According to the Ministry, the officials were acting on a decision to implement measures for the seizure of domestic animals.
The same woman had a conflict with FVA officials in December last year. At the time, as the Public Prosecutor’s Office announced, her father and his two daughters were suspected of using force and serious threats to prevent officials from acting on a final and enforceable decision for the seizure of large livestock.
Following the latest developments, a public disagreement has also emerged over which institution has jurisdiction to deal with this issue. According to Mayor Saško Mitovski, the municipality has no jurisdiction to act, but the FVA says the opposite.
“The municipality has no legal competencies to act in this case; they lie exclusively with the Food and Veterinary Agency,” Mayor Mitovski said in an interview for Prizma.
The Food and Veterinary Agency reacted most strongly to this statement. The Agency said that, pursuant to the Law on Public Cleanliness, oversight of the maintenance of public areas falls under municipal jurisdiction. This includes keeping and grazing large livestock on public spaces.
“We remind Mitovski that it is irresponsible toward his own citizens and the residents of the Palanka villages for him to exempt himself from responsibility in this case, because under the Law on Public Cleanliness, Article 14, paragraph 1, item 11, control over the maintenance of public areas—namely the keeping and grazing of large livestock (including cattle) on public areas—lies precisely with the Municipality. If he wanted to, Mitovski could have solved the problem by now,” the FVA said.
The Delegation of the European Union to North Macedonia marked the fourth anniversary of the full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine with a special screening of the documentary film “Porcelain War” (Porcelain War) on February 24 at the “Frosina” cinema at the Youth Cultural Center in Skopje.
The EU Ambassador to North Macedonia, Michalis Rokas, reaffirmed the EU’s strong support for Ukraine and its people, advocating for an acceptable solution to achieve peace. He emphasized that the EU also values North Macedonia’s support for Ukraine, expressed through the participation of the Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for European Affairs, Bekim Sali, at the commemoration in Kyiv.
The event was part of a global series of initiatives coordinated by the European External Action Service (EEAS) to mark Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine and to reaffirm support for Ukrainian sovereignty, peace, and solidarity. Organized under the “#TeamEurope” banner, the screening was attended by representatives of institutions, civil society organizations, diplomatic missions, and partners.
The screening was complemented by a joint op-ed published by the EU Ambassador to North Macedonia, Michalis Rokas, and the Ambassador of Ukraine to North Macedonia, Larysa Dir.
Reflecting on current developments, the ambassadors warned that “peace without accountability is an illusion. Peace built on impunity is not peace. It is a pause before the next attack.” They pointed out that Europe has learned the historical lesson that “every time aggression was rewarded with silence or concessions, it returned stronger.”
The ambassadors reaffirmed the continued political, humanitarian, economic, and military support of the European Union for Ukraine and stressed the importance of unity and solidarity.
The documentary “Porcelain War” won the Grand Jury Prize at the Sundance Film Festival in 2024 and was nominated for the Academy Award for Best Documentary Feature. The film bears witness to cultural resistance and the resilience of civil society in wartime conditions through the personal stories of Ukrainian artists fighting against Russian aggression.
By organizing the screening in Skopje, the EU Delegation sent a message that the consequences of the war are felt beyond Ukraine’s borders and that European solidarity remains crucial for preserving peace, democratic values, and international law.
Activists inside and outside Venezuela have announced coordinated screenings of the documentary “From Macedonia with Love” (De Macedonia con amor) in around 20 cities worldwide on February 21, in a bid to keep attention on the contested July 28, 2024 presidential election and its disputed aftermath.
The events, part of what organizers are calling an “International Day for Amnesty in Venezuela,” will include a public screening at the Universidad Central de Venezuela in Caracas alongside simultaneous showings across the Americas and Europe, supported by civil society groups such as the Committee for the Liberation of Political Prisoners (CLIPPVE) and the Washington Office on Latin America (WOLA).
“De Macedonia con amor” reconstructs opposition claims of widespread fraud and subsequent crackdown following the July 2024 vote — when incumbent Nicolás Maduro was declared the winner amid accusations of manipulation and a lack of transparency from election authorities. International observers and regional leaders also criticized the official result as lacking credibility.
The initiative has also touched on a disinformation narrative pushed by Venezuelan officials in 2024, blaming North Macedonia for a supposed cyberattack on the country’s election system — a claim widely regarded as unfounded and unsupported by evidence.
In a statement for Meta.mk, Venezuelan activists from Caracas said it remains uncertain how Venezuelan authorities will react to the screenings, given that the current leadership and institutions accused of perpetrating the election irregularities remain in place — even after Maduro’s disputed leadership was challenged by the United States and several Western governments.
Within Venezuela, the screenings come amid ongoing political tension and international criticism of the Venezuelan government’s handling of dissent and electoral integrity. Supporters see the documentary as a way to highlight civil liberties and transparency, while critics warn of possible reprisals from authorities wary of public mobilization.
The screenings abroad will take place in Mexico (Mexico City), Spain (Madrid, Barcelona, Valencia, Alicante), Argentina (Buenos Aires, Mar del Plata), Colombia (Bogotá), Uruguay (Montevideo), Chile (Santiago de Chile), Italy (Brescia, Torino), Germany (Berlin, Bamberg), the United States (Portland, Oregon), and Switzerland (Basel).
On February 18 (Wednesday) at 7:00 PM, a promotion event for the comic “Lom: The Well of Endless Foreboding” by authors Ivica Dukoski and Vladimir Blagojević will be held at Laboratorium in Skopje. The comic is published by Flicker Studio.
The event is organized by Lom Lom and is open to the public.
This is an epic fantasy comic about the adventures of wizard Lom in a parallel universe where magic works.
“Lom: The Well of Endless Foreboding” combines elements of fantasy with existential panic and gentle irony, in a story where fate does not accept outside opinions. It is a sequel to the graphic novel “Lom – The Wizard from the Great Nothing” (2020).
The comic will be available for purchase at the event at a promotional price, and admission is free for all interested visitors.
The duo Vladimir Blagojević – Vladodlak and Ivica Dukoski are also the authors of the graphic novel “The Black Aurora” (2018), the science fiction series “Neon Nights” and “The Holy Hunters,” as well as the children’s adventure comic “Anika and Tigran.”
Old nationalist myths such as “Greater Albania”, “Greater Serbia” and “Greater Greece” have long since become worn out and historically failed, especially considering the fact that Greece is already a member of the European Union. Instead of territorial expansion, European integration has become the real framework for political and economic development.
In this context, the Western Balkan countries that are not yet EU members remain trapped in mutual fears and mistrust, which further distances them from their own development path. Such narratives do not build a future, but rather maintain artificial conflicts and serve as a tool for internal political mobilization.
Hence, the key question arises: who benefits from the revival of these long-worn rhetorics at a time when more and more young people are leaving the region and seeking their future precisely in European countries?
Selective Quotation and Ethnic Mobilization in Pre-Election Discourse
In North Macedonia, this narrative is dominant due to the current political situation and represents one of the most easily combustible discourses when it comes to polarization, hate speech, and inciting interethnic tensions. Nationalist interpretations are quickly activated, especially when statements by politicians are conveyed half-heartedly, selectively, and without a broader context.
Such an example is Ali Ahmeti’s statement of September 24, 2025, in which he warned that if North Macedonia does not continue on the path to the European Union, citizens could face the choice of seeking their future in other countries, partly in Albania, partly in Bulgaria. In the same statement, Ahmeti explicitly called for not inciting hatred, emphasizing that it is not about territorial claims, but about the reality that Albania and Bulgaria are already members of the EU, which is not entirely true.
However, a significant part of the media reported this message out of context, reducing it to a sensationalist headline:
“Macedonia will be divided – some will go with Albania, others with Bulgaria”, with the statement being presented as a prediction or threat of the breakup of the state.
This narrative is often manipulated by other political actors by referring to old, contextually detached statements. One such example is the announcement by a member of parliament from the Left Party in which an old speech by Bilal Kasami is recycled, presented as a current and programmatic position.
In the announcement, Kasami is attributed with the statement “Let’s make Macedonia the second Albanian state”, without specifying the time, occasion or context, thus creating the impression that this is a current political agenda. Such selective reference to an old speech serves to artificially revive fears related to “Greater Albania” and the alleged Albanianization of Macedonian society.
Although formally denying Albanophobia, the rhetoric is filled with ethnically coded accusations, such as “neo-Albanism”, “irredentism” and “Macedonophobia”, which deepen interethnic distrust. Additionally, by drawing in VMRO-DPMNE, a polarizing political front is being constructed where the ethnic issue is used as a tool for electoral mobilization.
The culmination of the message is the alarmist thesis that with electoral support for certain parties, Macedonia will become a “second Albanian state”, which is a classic example of a disinformation narrative based on fear, selective quoting and historical revisionism, rather than real political processes.
Albania, “Greater Albania” and the Rama–Kurti rivalry
Albania as a state, especially in the last few years, has clearly not supported the project of a “Greater Albania”. For Tirana, it seems that European integration, regional stability and maintaining good relations with neighbors and international partners are a much higher priority. Albanian Prime Minister Edi Rama has made this clear in his policy: the goal is to complete negotiations with the European Union by 2027 and achieve full membership by 2030. A possible territorial expansion is not only not a priority, but would also jeopardize this European agenda and return Albania to the old nationalist and conflict narratives of the Balkans.
In addition, the relationship between Edi Rama and the Prime Minister of Kosovo, Albin Kurti, reflects the complex dynamics of Albanian politics in the Balkans. Rama positions himself as a pragmatic leader, focused on stability and European integration, while Kurti acts more sharply, with an emphasis on Kosovo’s sovereignty. Their rivalry is also reflected in domestic politics, creating cross-border polarization and making it difficult to harmonize government policies. Despite their common ethnic basis, the conflict shows that Albania and Kosovo are not always harmonious in their priorities, emphasizing the need for dialogue and compromise.
The “Greater Albania” narrative also conflicts with Kosovo’s diplomatic goals because it undermines sovereignty, territorial integrity, and multiethnic coexistence as prerequisites for international recognition and European integration.
Kosovo’s primary goal is full international recognition as an independent and sovereign state and membership in international organizations, including the UN. The pursuit of unification with Albania would suggest that Kosovo’s current statehood is only a secondary or temporary goal, potentially lending credibility to arguments against its independent legitimacy and playing into the hands of countries like Serbia and Russia that dispute its existence.
Fitim Gashi, Sbunker | Photo: personal archive, used with permission
Journalist and head of the anti-disinformation program, Fitim Gashi, from Sbunker, points out that the topic remains sensitive and affects the balance between national symbolic goals and Kosovo’s real diplomatic needs.
“However, the main political leadership of Kosovo generally avoids officially supporting the Greater Albania project for various reasons. Official positions from both Kosovo and Albania claim that true “national unification” will be achieved through the process of both countries’ accession to the European Union, where borders within the Union become less significant. This approach is considered a safer and less complicated path than territorial changes,” says Gashi.
While the “Greater Albania” narrative is often used for internal political mobilization and serves specific political agendas, the reality is quite different. The countries of the Western Balkans, including Albania, Kosovo and North Macedonia, are aiming for European integration as the main path for stability, development and regional cooperation.
Bojana Zorić, a policy analyst at the European Union Institute for Security Studies (EUISS), emphasizes that all narratives that undermine regional stability or question existing borders are fundamentally incompatible with the EU integration process.
“EU institutions and leaders have consistently stressed that the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all enlargement partners must be fully respected and that any rhetoric or actions that challenge these principles are unacceptable. In addition, the EU has consistently stressed that good neighbourly relations in the Western Balkans are at the heart of accession. Therefore, continued efforts to foster regional trust, maintain stability and avoid divisive or revisionist narratives are essential for Albania – as they are for all Western Balkan partners – as they progress on the path to EU accession,” says Zorić.
Bojana Zorić, EUISS | Photo: Personal archive, used with permission
The Balkans are in a complex position where foreign policy influences and internal vulnerabilities are intertwined. History and geopolitical configuration make the region vulnerable to external pressures and the interests of great powers, while internal problems such as corruption, weak institutional capacity, nationalism and mistrust between ethnic communities often deepen conflicts and hinder economic and political stability.
In other words, the Balkans often suffer from external manipulation, but at the same time they create their own limitations through disagreements, old nationalist myths and policies that are not oriented towards results and regional cooperation.
The Balkans need a policy that is not based on nationalism and fear, but on concrete results and economic development. Political points should be achieved by improving living standards, creating jobs, modernizing infrastructure and tackling systemic problems such as unemployment, corruption and weak regional cooperation. European integration and cooperation between neighbors offer a realistic framework for addressing these challenges and building a stable, prosperous and trusting society, where nationalism and fear are no longer tools for political mobilization. The Balkans need to get out of the victim mentality and focus on the future, instead of being tied to worn-out nationalist myths.
Macedonia, as a country with a distinctly multiethnic composition, constantly faces challenges arising from tensions between its main communities. For decades, interethnic relations between Albanians and Macedonians, in addition to being aggravated by the conflicts in the country, have also been aggravated by prejudices and certain harmful narratives, which in some cases are also instigators of these conflicts. The results of the monitoring of the Metamorphosis Foundation show that these narratives risk presenting North Macedonia as a fragile, divided society, incapable of building a sustainable welfare state, writes Portalb.mk.
Fertile ground for the reinforcement of harmful narratives are matches at sports stadiums where racist and nationalist chants spread spontaneously, but also in an organized manner. From the cacophony of hatred that then spreads to the digital sphere, one cannot see the spirit of cooperation between players, especially in sports clubs with mixed composition, who, although they come from different ethnicities and religions, are one in the sports arena and play united.
One of the most positive examples is the Macedonian national football team. Its composition, from an ethnic point of view, is mixed. Albanians, Macedonians and other communities, together share the disappointments of defeats and the joys of victories, writes Portalb.mk.
Harmful or malignant narratives usually aim for divisions, highlighting differences as a risk. They manipulate history to justify hostility and victimization, and use emotional language that incites fear, insecurity and hatred.
Sports fields are often spaces where cries of hate and ethnic grounds occur, and the corresponding fan groups become particularly active when posting about such events.
One example is the act of vandalism in Drachevo, Skopje, where an icon of Jesus Christ was destroyed in a local park, and a Quran was left next to it. The incident was sensationalized in the media, further fueling interfaith and interethnic tensions. The fan group “Komiti” responded with a statement: “We will not forgive you.” Interestingly, the media amplified the statement of the fan group “Komiti”, placing it prominently in their media coverage. However, many comments from citizens, according to these reports, had a different tone, emphasizing that no true believer would commit such an act and, unlike typical examples, these comments did not contain hatred.
This case reflects a broader pattern in the country, where Islam is almost always viewed through the prism of ethnicity. Such an interpretation is often reinforced by the media and sports fan groups, turning religious incidents into tools to incite interethnic tensions and serve political goals.
Non-governmental organizations are constantly raising the alarm about the risk of normalizing hate speech.
“Sports stands continue to be spaces where offensive and discriminatory messages are spread, especially on ethnic and national grounds. Such speech, especially when expressed publicly, has the potential to cause deep divisions, disrupt interethnic cohesion, and can even lead to hate crimes,” the Helsinki Committee says. According to them, ethnicity continues to dominate over the years as the most common basis for hate speech and hate crimes, while the most numerous perpetrators and victims are young people. “For this very reason, we believe that public condemnation is the minimum that political structures can do, while the competent institutions should identify and punish the perpetrators,” the Helsinki Committee further says.
Not everything is so dark
However, there are many other positive examples in which the narratives expressed through fan groups are refuted, and then they gain resonance and try to present a different picture of society, the different ethnicities living in North Macedonia, but also the country in general.
One of the most positive examples is the national football team. Its composition, from an ethnic point of view, is mixed. Albanians, Macedonians and other communities, together share the disappointments of defeats and the joys of victories. For now, the team is aiming for the next historic success, after participating in the European Football Championship EURO 2028.
Sports journalist, Reshat Ibrahimi, is among the most active journalists present at the national team’s matches, both at home and abroad. He commented on the atmosphere in the team and the staff in the federation for Portalb.mk.
“The atmosphere in the Macedonian national team is very good. And such an environment has certainly been influenced by the positive results of the national team in the last decade, where Macedonia participated in the European Championship and is now on the verge of another historic success to participate in the finals of the World Cup in 2026 in the USA, Mexico and Canada. Another factor for such a climate in the Macedonian national team is coach Blagoja Milevski, who has managed to create a team with quality football players whom he knows well and whom he trains.
Reshat Ibrahimi. Photo from personal archive
The players, Ibrahimi adds, respect each other and have a healthy friendship. “They are all professionals, because they come from different European championships. Enis Bardi, who is Albanian, is the captain and he enjoys great respect from all his teammates. Bardi is the leader of Macedonia’s successes, but not only him but also others who have merit for the successes so far. He is a person and they don’t see him whether he is Albanian or not. The current president of the federation, Masar Omeragic, is also credited with the good atmosphere, who has been suppressing these inappropriate phenomena since he took over the head of the federation. He even announced that in the future, rival fans will also follow the matches in the stands. North Macedonia is a country for everyone who lives in this country and we should all look forward to Europe and European values,” Ibrahimi concludes.
The national team will face Denmark in the semi-finals of the World Cup qualifiers on March 26 at 8:45 p.m. The match with the Danes will be played at the Parken Stadium in Copenhagen. The winner of this match will face the better team from the other match, Northern Ireland – Czech Republic, for a place at the 2026 World Cup.
But what are the institutions doing to protect the harmony that reflects the national team?
The Football Federation of Macedonia, in their responses to Portalb.mk, emphasized that the federation is working long-term to create a healthy sports atmosphere and condemns nationalistic slogans, hate speech and any form of discrimination.
“Recently, together with UNICEF, we have been working on educational campaigns, cooperation with clubs and schools, as well as sending preventive messages before each of our activities. In parallel, we are working on improving regulations and sanctions, which allow for a faster and more effective reaction when the sporting spirit of matches is violated. Our goal is for the stands to be a place of support, not a ‘platform’ for spreading fear or division,” the federation says.
To improve the atmosphere, the federation promises to continue the work of educating the new categories about respect, diversity and fair play; to increase control in the organization of matches with clear protocols for preventing incidents and coordination with club safety commissioners; and to develop continuous campaigns with football players, especially those from the A national team, who best convey the message of unity. They point out that success does not know ethnicity, but work and dedication.
“Our message is clear: such behavior is not part of sport and is not part of the values we want to promote. On the contrary, we will punish every case. Any cheering that humiliates, insults or incites hatred harms the sport and punishes precisely those who come for football – the players and true fans. We constantly appeal to fan groups to support their team with passion, but also with respect. Football should unite, not divide,” the federation said.
The head of the football federation, Masar Omeragic, confirmed that the strongest response to deviant behavior is professionalism, calmness and focus on the game.
Masar Omeragić Photo from personal archive
“We need to be an example for the new generations. My personal message is that respect for the opponent, for the fans and for one’s own team is the foundation of football and sport in general. Every institution, federation and club has its role. Institutions provide the framework and mechanisms for punishing hate speech and any form of discrimination. The federation should conduct educational and preventive campaigns and have clear norms for action in case of violation of rights. Clubs have an obligation to work with fans, prevent risky situations and encourage positive cheering. Athletes are the ones who send the strongest message, their behavior should be respectful and fair play. When we all act together, football returns to its true value – both on the field and in the stands,” says FFM President Omeragić.
Sport should unite, not create divisions
The Ministry of Sports says that sport should unite, connect people, and not create divisions. Therefore, they are aware that nationalistic and provocative chants that create tension appear on some sports fields.
“The Ministry of Sports is in constant communication with federations, clubs and security institutions to prevent these phenomena. We should all work together to eradicate these negative phenomena, through education, through the establishment of stricter disciplinary mechanisms and through campaigns that promote ‘fair play’. Our goal as the Ministry of Sports is to promote the true values of respect, dignity and coexistence through sport, and we will always be firmly against any attempt to use sport for nationalistic or political purposes,” says the Minister of Sports, Borko Ristovski.
The head of the Ministry of Sports promises that specific and coordinated activities are planned. Minister Ristovski announced in a statement to Portalb.mk that he will propose changes to the federations’ regulations for rapid response and sanctioning, strengthen prevention through programs for young fans, and, together with the Ministry of Internal Affairs, establish mechanisms for identifying and acting against organized groups that spread hatred and cause incidents on sports fields.
“With every action we take, we strive to make sport accessible to everyone, in every city and municipality in the country, for young people to engage in sports, and through sports to promote positive values and build a positive sports spirit. This is a duty, but also a shared responsibility for all of us,” says Ristovski.
Borko Ristovski, photo from his Facebook page
Our message, the minister added, is clear: hate speech, nationalism, racism and any form of inappropriate behavior in the stands are not sports and will not be tolerated. Any person who knowingly disrupts the sports atmosphere will face punitive measures, he added.
“As an athlete, I have played in halls all over Europe and have often heard all kinds of provocations. But I have never allowed them to distract me from my goal. The strongest response is the game on the field. I also believe that institutions should react quickly, while federations and clubs should take on their role. Athletes, in turn, should be an example – with fair play, respect and maturity. I believe that athletes are the best ambassadors of positive values. Respect is the greatest trophy we can win. My personal message is simple: Cheer as you would like to cheer for your child,” concluded Minister Ristovski.
The editorial team of Portalb.mk argued in a series of articles that the inadequate reaction of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the Prosecutor’s Office and the few cases with a court verdict further fuel hate speech. A timely reaction would protect the values that best represent our country, which are the sports atmosphere and sports successes.
“Scandal in France: Macedonian Smederevka sold as Burgundy wine for 250 euros per liter!” “French wine scandal–Macedonian Smederevka sold as premium Burgudny wine,” ” The French sold Macedonian wine as their own,” “French wines were filled with Macedonian Smederevka from Mrzenci,” “Europol: Macedonian Smederevka was sold as French wine,” “At Mr. Gjoko’s place in Mrzenci it costs 0.5 euros, and the same wine in France 250 euros…” But there were also more moderare headlines, such as “Smederevka as a good alternative to French wines, sold for 250 euros.”
Screenshot of one of the headlines in a Macedonian media outlet about Macedonian Smederevka in Burgundy
The text was full of details. From the Europol investigation, to statements from “Mr. Gjoko from Mrzenci,” whose wine “made it to Burgundy,” and a French oenologist who extensively described the characteristics of both regions and their respective wines. In their excitement, media paid little attention to the details. Neither to the correct pronunciation of “Chablis” (shah-blee) and “Montrachet” (mon-rah-shay), nor to the oenologist’s name–Tele Repomashe, which those more confident in their French pronunciation transcribed as Tele Repomash. It never occurred to them that the name is pronounced exactly as it is written, just like the Serbian phrase “tele-repom-maše,” meaning: a calf waves its tail. They also missed another important detail–the date: April 1st.
While “Vino & Fino” politely published in the afternoon that the article was an April Fool’s joke, the “scandal” had already been picked up by almost all Macedonian media—especially online. Most ran completely identical headlines, many copied the text word for word, and not a single one verified the claims from the Serbian media.
Screenshot of the text on the Serbian portal “Vino & Fino” where they reveal that it is a joke
An unintentional textbook example of information manipulation
Although it was an April Fool’s joke, and a masterful one at that, the elements it contained and the way it spread and went viral unintentionally make the story of Smederevka a textbook example of information manipulation.
A surprising headline, a provocative topic, and emotional hooks made the story irresistible both to the audience and to the media, which, lacking time, capacity, or sufficient professionalism to verify it, simply passed it on. In this way, the story spreads spontaneously, without the need for any special channels for distributing disinformation. On top of that, different media emphasize different aspects of the story, giving it a certain “spin” or angle. As a result, the media naturally cluster—from outlets that accurately but unfortunately relayed false news, to groups of media with shared ownership, ideology, or political orientation that added their own perspective, to those that simply copy the text word for word. The spread is further amplified through social media, where users, unlike traditional media, have no obligation to verify a story before sharing it.
Sead Dzigal, photo: Vancho Dzambaski
„This news ties into the widely accepted narrative that Macedonia, although geographically small, has a rich tradition of delicious food and drinks of world-class quality. Such news knows no borders because it is potentially viral and is often published by tabloid media. These outlets frequently publish sensational and provocative content aimed at attracting attention, using various techniques to make information go viral, such as clickbait headlines, polarizing stories, sensationalist topics and events, and so on. In Macedonia, the influence of online media from the region is still strong, and content easily spills over from one linguistic sphere to another, most often from Serbia, Croatia, Bulgaria, and Albania,” explains university professor Sead Dzigal, a communications expert.
According to the professor, the main reasons for both its spread, as well as for the dissemination of disinformation during what is today called foreign interference and manipulation of information (FIMI), are low professional standards, low media literacy, and narratives designed to provoke strong emotions, as well as the use of polarizing topics. Disinformation spreads through clusters of tabloid and propaganda media and easily spills over regionally due to their strong influence.
“These entertaining and seemingly harmless pieces of disinformation are quite common and appear periodically depending on the context of events. Many examples are well known, such as fake prize draws, celebrity news, fake medicines, recommendations motivated by superstition, or sensational news, for instance, the escape of a lion from the Bitola zoo a few years ago,” says communications expert Sead Dzigal, a university professor.
Undoubtedly, the story about Smederevka was intended as a harmless joke, without any “malicious” intent. Yet, even as such, it takes on a sensationalist, and at times even political, “spin” in the various media outlets that report it.
These “distortions” are even more pronounced in other April Fool’s jokes in the region, which, unlike the Smederevka story, also elicited political reactions—exactly the goal of any campaign of information interference and manipulation. A handful of such pranks went so far as to generate hundreds of media reports and undoubtedly reach a million-strong audience.
April fool’s jokes as a tradition: Ceca’s Chinese helicopter and Montenegro’s economic program
April Fool’s jokes used to be a regular ritual in the media across the region. Today, Podgorica’s “Vijesti” is one of the few outlets that still maintains this tradition, often provoking serious reactions—from the public, politicians, and even state authorities in Montenegro, as well as in the wider region.
For example, in 2011, during the first year of the online edition Vijesti.me, they published a story claiming that Ceca Ražnatović, who was facing a court case in Serbia, was applying for Montenegrin citizenship. The outlet announced that Ceca would arrive at Tivat Airport from Ljubljana in a Chinese helicopter. The post, published at 2 a.m. on April 1 by the author P. Travanj (Travanj = April), had already fooled over 5,000 people by morning—ranging from those who “moved” abroad in outrage, politicians threatening to revoke citizenship, to correspondents preparing at Tivat Airport to welcome Ceca’s flight. Before “Vijesti” could manage to clarify that the text was a traditional April Fool’s joke, Serbian media had already taken a statement from their Minister of Internal Affairs, Ivica Dačić, while the Montenegrin Ministry of Interior issued a statement expressing outrage at the “mockery” of authorities issuing personal documents, as well as of the citizens.
Screenshot of the Vijesti article about Ceca and her Montenegrin citizenship
Last year, “Vijesti” carried out perhaps its most successful April Fool’s joke to date. The post claiming that Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina „had requested to copy“ Montenegro’s economic program “Europe Now” fooled more than 63,000 visitors on the Podgorica-based media outlet’s website, generated around 430 reactions, and over 100 comments. Yet the actual impact was far greater.
The second post, in which Vijesti published “aprillili…” [“April Fools!”], received nearly 45,000 views on the newspaper’s website alone.
In the article, a “source involved in the negotiations” claims that Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić asked Finance Minister Siniša Mali and Prime Minister Miloš Vučević to keep the “copying” secret and to give the project a new name, so that it would not be associated with Montenegro’s program. If it were to be linked anyway, the article masterfully reports, Vučić allegedly instructed the ministers to claim that Montenegro copied from Serbia and that the Serbian program was “faster, better, and bigger.” The president also reportedly ordered that Serbia implement the program before it was adopted in Bosnia, so they could claim that Bosnians had copied from them. And, Vučić added, Serbian salaries should be at least ten euros higher.
Like the Smederevka story, the article about the economic program is full of details, which lends it plausibility; it cites statements and references institutions, giving it credibility, authenticity, and authority.
Most importantly, the post plays on national pride—encouraging it in some, provoking it in others. This is precisely what triggered the strongest reactions.
Siniša Mali reacted immediately, and Serbian pro-government media outlets almost simultaneously reported it. In a long Facebook post, Mali provided a detailed description of the Serbian government’s measures and programs, along with the results that, according to him, put Serbia “far ahead of everyone in the region, together”—almost like the story in Vijesti.
However, not all jokes are successful. Some barely elicit a smile, like an awkward joke by a Serbian tabloid claiming that Bosnia and Herzegovina had banned cheese-filled burek. In Croatia, the government and HDZ criticized the portal Penzija (mirovina.hr) for a joke about a canceled pension bonus. Others are outright tasteless, such as the hoax about a planted bomb that emptied three schools in Bihać, Bosnia and Herzegovina.
Screenshot of an article in the Serbian “Alo” claiming that Bosnia banned cheese-filled burek
Rama at the head of NATO, the prankster on the stake
Probably no recent April Fool’s joke had as much impact as the post claiming that Edi Rama would become Secretary General of NATO.
Barely two hours past midnight on April 1, 2022, user Suzana Starikov tweeted on “X”:
„Edi Rama will succeed Jens Stoltenberg as NATO Secretary General. The US in particular is said to have insisted on electing the next NATO Secretary General among the new NATO members. The candidates were Estonia’s PM Katja Kalas and Albania’s Prime Minister Edi Rama. Who will be the next Albanian PM?“ (Kaja Kallas, today EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security, editor’s note)
Within the next 24 hours, the post became a textbook example of information manipulation, ticking every box on the list: from social media publication, to “laundering” the story, and building, or undermining—the credibility of the source. The tweet perfectly and crystal-clear demonstrated the unprofessionalism and bias of the media, as well as the polarization of society, both locally and across the region.
„German analyst, academic, and researcher Suzana Starikov claims that Edi Rama is the next Secretary General of NATO after Jens Stoltenberg” had already appeared by morning as a headline in several Tirana media outlets.
„O.K. folks, this is an April fool’s trick (of course!). I wouldn’t explain this, but I had to do it, because some Albanian language media outlets published the tweet without any research–they even picked up my spelling mistakes in the name of the Estonian PM in their news,” Suzana tweeted again.
But it was already too late. The news was widely picked up by dozens of Albanian-language media outlets. It crossed borders and spread to Kosovo, as well as to North Macedonia and Serbia. While Starikov was trying to correct the Albanian-language media outlets, the “story” began to be picked up by Serbian-language outlets in the region. By the end of the day, Macedonian media had also carried the “story.”
Seeing that the Balkans had taken the joke seriously, the would-be jokester continued tweeting that she had only been joking and that the media should not report claims without verifying them—but to no avail. The “news” about Edi’s appointment as head of NATO, supposedly backed by the Americans, was already in dozens of media outlets in the region, in three languages, seen several hundred thousand times, with thousands of shares and hundreds of comments.
Meanwhile, some readers of the Albanian media outlets began leaving comments claiming that the author was, in fact, Suzana Skenderi, a translator from Tirana married and living in Germany.
Screenshot of an article about Edi Rama in Serbian
While the fire sparked by Suzana was raging across the Balkans, Albanian-language media outlets began to characterize the source in different ways. From the very beginning, the Albanian-language outlets split along clear lines: in describing the source, some used the phrase “the well-known German analyst, academic, and researcher,” while others called her “a translator from Germany.” By the end of the day, however, once they finally accepted that it had been a joke, all of them jointly attacked her for spreading fake news.
Macedonia, too, from time to time bears witness to disinformation that originates on social media and then gains traction in the media. In February 2022, a joke surfaced in Bitola claiming that a lion had escaped from the zoo. For several days it was a main topic of conversation among the people of Bitola, until the situation was clarified by the police and local authorities.
Fishing for emotional “hooks”
What do all these stories have in common, and why did they go viral? First, there is the topic itself, which is meant to provoke surprise and interest, but also to be polarizing, that is, to contain emotional “hooks” on which the reader can latch: touching on national pride, culture, tradition, or some other value close to the target audience. Most often, a large portion of the media also latch onto the same “hooks,” and then “free of charge” spread the story even more widely—this being the second element in the mechanism of dissemination. In addition to the media that latch on spontaneously, the disinformation is further spread, each from its own angle, by clusters of politically, economically, or ideologically aligned outlets, which constitute the third element in the chain, with the fourth being social media users. The fifth element in the story is the readers, especially those with a low level of information culture, or “media literacy,” who eagerly “swallow” the story and wholeheartedly share it.
Disinformation is simple, emotional, and often uses stylistic devices to emphasize its message. It contains an “emotional hook” that “fishes” for ethnic, political, historical, or cultural sentiments, as highlighted in the analysis “Foreign Interference and Manipulation of Information.” Disinformation is often disseminated from a single center (Belgrade, Tirana) and then spreads across the region, local media outlets pick it up without verification due to limited resources and capacities.
The main sources of disinformation and FIMI are online media outlets and social networks, amplified by so-called “bots” and coordinated activities designed to exploit algorithms. Many online outlets are anonymous and sensationalist, while political bias, polarization, and low media literacy in society increase vulnerability and enable the spread of SMIs. Citizens believe they can recognize false media content, but very few actually verify it.
Local communities are the first to be affected, due to ethnic, political, and cultural differences. The Macedonian media system, subject to economic and political influence and lacking strong regulatory mechanisms, combined with distrust in institutions and political polarization, increases susceptibility to manipulation.
Disinformation is formulated in a simple and emotional manner, which makes it more accessible and influential to the general public. It articulates emotions, evokes empathy, attacks values, and undermines trust. It is often stylistically well-crafted, using hyperbole, inappropriate comparisons, omitting key points that could change the course of the argument or thesis, and emphasizing problematic aspects that serve its objectives,” the study emphasizes.
But they also have another, essential element—the so-called emotional “hook”: “Even when there is no direct connection, they imply ethnic issues, political frustrations, and historically sensitive topics,” the analysis states.
This analysis also emphasizes the strong mutual influence of the countries in the region and the spillover of disinformation.
Of around twenty studies from the region examining the problem of disinformation, one explains it particularly briefly and precisely—the analytical report by the Center for Information, Democracy, and Citizenship at the American University in Bulgaria, prepared by the Working Group on Disinformation in Albania. Although it focuses on the situation in Albania, the elements, techniques, and mechanisms it describes are universal for the region.
The group identified a series of elements in the dissemination of disinformation. Linguistic patterns present issues through binary oppositions (bipolar opposition), portraying the world in clear, opposing pairs: good–bad, us–them, patriots–traitors, democrats–anti-democrats, East–West. This rhetorical device is meant to polarize and simplify complex topics, leaving no room for doubt.
Another element is the stirring of emotions (emotional triggering). Among the techniques used are constant, repeated intimidation, as well as ‘anger framing’—that is, claims designed to provoke anger toward specific groups, such as politicians, ethnic groups, migrants, foreigners…
Effective techniques also include personalization, in which fabricated testimonies are presented, as well as anecdotal “evidence” instead of scientific or statistical data. To create a sense of intimacy, or even greater personalization, the stories are woven around the ordinary citizen.
Finally, conspiratorial logic is applied, linking unrelated events into convincing but inaccurate narratives, most often about hidden, powerful structures that control events.
“Virtually every one of these elements, of course driven by different motives, is present in the story about Smederevka. From the opposition between the West and the Balkans, through the anger over the economic exploitation of wine that costs half a euro and is sold for 250, to apparent testimonies from Mr. Gjoko, the ordinary citizen, and the oenologist, and finally to “evidence” in the form of a Europol investigation.
Last, but no less important, a characteristic of disinformation is the high adaptability of the narrative and its evolution over the course of “retelling,” a path that “Smederevka” also followed.
“Disinformation actors quickly adapt their language and narrative to current events,” the analysis notes, “and the language is adjusted to fit the stylistic norms of each platform to which the story migrates”—from TikTok memes, through long debates on Facebook, to pseudo-academic discourses on Telegram…
The last element is localization, where global disinformation motifs are systematically adapted for a specific region through its particular cultural codes, linguistic references, and historical analogies.
In addition to content, techniques are also copied
All of these elements and tactics, as well as the entire mechanism for spreading disinformation, are almost regularly observed in reported cases of disinformation in the region.
In Albania, the organizations Faktoje and SEE Check recorded more than a thousand cases of fake or manipulative visual posts on Instagram in 2024, including viral videos that falsely claimed that the European Union had banned Albanian products. This content uses the same emotional rhetoric as the previous ones–invoking national pride and disenfranchisement, without basic fact-checking. The mechanism and techniques are well described by the Working Group on Disinformation in Albania, which also concludes that the centralization of media in Tirana leaves a vacuum in the rest of the country, the ideological ownership of media groups enables the unhindered spread of biased and misleading content, and the media, in general, serves as amplifiers of political party messages or for the dissemination of “clickbait” content. The TikTok platform is cited as a “critical vector” for the spread of disinformation, especially among young people, but the government’s campaign to abolish it is assessed as undemocratic. According to the Group, influencers, entertainers, pseudo-experts, as well as Facebook groups and messaging apps, also play an important role. Among the existing disinformation topics, however, are conspiracy theories about Covid-19 and health topics, theories related to Soros, the war in Ukraine, integration into the European Union…
In Bosnia and Herzegovina, the platform Raskrinkavanje analyzed more than 3,700 news stories and found that much of the ethno-nationalist disinformation begins as jokes or memes, which then turn into “real” news on local online media outlets. Raskrinkavanje also has a special section for satire, and it covers disinformation that is “off the deep end,” such as the story of a man who identified himself as a deer and was shot by hunters. The platform pays particular attention to social networks. Raskrinkavanje has so far analyzed more than 3,900 posts on Facebook, and TikTok has been identified as a new and particularly fast tool for distributing such content, which shows how quickly a humorous context can turn into a political narrative.
Kosovo is a battlefield for disinformation from Serbian and Albanian-language media outlets. Among the narratives, according to the Disinformation and Civil Society Mapping Report by Metamorphosis, are those that the formation of a community of Serbian municipalities means that Kosovo has surrendered to Serbia, or that the US is not protecting Muslims, which is being spread by disinformation about the conflict in Gaza. The series continues with accusations of a “mafia state” and transmitted Russian narratives from the Serbian side, or posts about the alleged deployment of the Serbian army on the border with Kosovo during the 2022 elections in Serbia, noted in the analysis “Geopolitical Perspective of Disinformation Flows in the Western Balkans.” After the incident in Banjska (2023), however, a large influx of disinformation was observed that appeared in Serbian groups on Facebook, and then within just a few hours was taken over and transmitted in Albanian by local Kosovo portals. This mechanism of rapid spillover and repackaging of content is identical to that of the Smederevka story.
In Montenegro, the Podgorica-based newspaper Vijesti has long been known for its April Fools’ Day jokes, including one about “the EU allegedly introducing a tax on rakija.” This post, although intended as humor, was reprinted by several regional media outlets and turned into “news” that Brussels was interfering in the traditions of the Balkans—the same type of satirical-political escalation that we see in the Smederevka story. But jokes aside, the Montenegrin Digital Forensic Center last year analyzed more than 62,000 national and regional media posts and concluded that 22 percent contained some form of manipulation.
Disinformation is transmitted through groups of media outlets that are politically, economically, or ideologically close, and that take over each other’s content. By multiplying news, they try to flood the information space and “hack” the algorithms of aggregators and social networks.
“A series of studies confirm that there are clusters of media outlets that create such content and are part of broader global turmoil and events. For example, the main regional media outlets that broadcast pro-Russian and anti-Western content about the war in Ukraine are more or less known and mapped, clusters of media outlets that only report positively and uncritically about China, then networks that are considered conservative and illiberal, media outlets with a pronounced liberal or leftist ideology and a number of others,” explains Dzigal, who states that he has confirmed knowledge of Russian and Chinese influence in the media, as well as pro-Western media outlets that often report uncritically and in a polarizing way. There are also regional groups that spread disinformation on ideological and religious grounds, while media outlets in the region are very susceptible to FIMI operations and manipulations, easily bribed and with poor standards in the area of professional and ethical journalism.
The spread is indirectly but wholeheartedly assisted by “conventional” media outlets, which in the transformation into the internet era lost the editorial system and the previously established practices for filtering information.
Foreigners lie, but our own lie as well
The role of domestic liars in operations involving “information interference and manipulation” is also highlighted in the monitoring of influence and disinformation campaigns in the Western Balkans by the Berlin-based Institute for Strategic Dialogue. The institute conducted monitoring in Macedonia, Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Kosovo from December 23, 2023 to June 2024, in which it analyzed 31,048 Telegram messages, 27,644 Facebook posts, 478 YouTube videos, and 62 daily media outlets, with their Facebook and Instagram pages, with more than 7.2 million followers.
“Despite the differences between the four Balkan countries analyzed in this report, ISD research shows that disinformation in the region is primarily driven by leading politicians, parties, and media outlets, far more than by foreign state and non-state actors. While a number of such actors have overt or implicit ties to Russia, Kremlin-affiliated media sites and voices have had limited success compared to domestic actors, who have used social media platforms to promote a range of misleading or patently false claims, as well as polarizing content,” the monitoring report concludes.
The biggest disinformers, according to the research on the effect of disinformation and foreign influences, are domestic politicians, 89 percent of respondents said, and disinformation is mostly spread through media outlets (85 percent), social networks and internet portals (82 percent).
A total of 83 percent of citizens believe that disinformation is a serious problem, and every second person stated that at least once a week they have noticed a completely fabricated story about someone’s political goals or agendas.
Three-quarters of respondents believe that the Government should take measures against disinformation, and at least two-thirds believe that it is important for journalists to be professional, to constantly report on the harmfulness of disinformation, to increase awareness of disinformation, to pass a law to protect against disinformation, to promote media literacy, to have an independent organization verify information, and for citizens to verify their own information.
Legislation to prevent and combat disinformation is also a recommendation of the analytical report on foreign interference and manipulation of information, which, among other things, recommends educational campaigns, regional dialogue, and support from the European Union.
Key elements in the fight against disinformation are a comprehensive whole-of-society approach, coordinated action with an appropriate, proportionate budget, smart and strategic measures, and a joint, regional strategic approach, including a common regional strategy, as outlined in the Blueprint for Protection of Democracy from Information Threats of the Anti-Disinformation Network for the Balkans.
The need for a systemic approach is also emphasized in the recommendations for building social resilience, as well as in the legal measures for preventing and sanctioning of disinformation in the Disinformation and Civil Society Mapping Report, which also proposes support for media literacy and regulation of online platforms.
The best way to prevent disinformation, according to Professor Dzigal, is to simply verify the information:
“In the race for fast, attention-grabbing news, this key rule is often ignored, which is why many such cases occur. The professional and ethical duty of a journalist is to check the news, find the sources of information, and attach their name to the published news, thereby guaranteeing its accuracy and professionalism. Journalists should act as professional communicators who uphold these standards, which are essential for public trust in anyone publishing content to inform society,” says Professor Dzigal.
During the first two weeks of July 2022, the streets of Skopje were blocked on a daily basis by thousands of people. Protests organized by the pro-Russian Levica party and the then opposition VMRO-DPMNE reached their peak on the very day when the President of the European Commission, Ursula von der Leyen, addressed members of parliament and the state leadership in the Assembly.
“Europe is waiting for you,” she declared from the podium—words that were barely audible over the din created by opposition MPs, who, waving banners and hurling insults, launched an attack on what is often described as the most powerful woman in the world.
“It would not be wise to wait for a better deal than the one presented by France. Of course, that is your right—but consider how much time we have already invested to get to this point,” von der Leyen added, after Levica leader Dimitar Apasiev placed a poster bearing a large NO! on the lectern.
A few days later, the Assembly gave the green light to the so-called “French proposal” with 68 votes in favor—more precisely, to the Negotiating Framework for accession talks with the European Union proposed by the French Presidency of the Council of the EU. The only explicit precondition for opening the negotiating chapters would remain the inclusion of Bulgarians in the preamble of the Macedonian Constitution. That parliamentary session, too, unfolded amid the blaring of vuvuzelas and chants from opposition MPs of VMRO-DPMNE and Levica. After the debate and before the vote, the two parties jointly walked out of the chamber in yet another act of protest.
Despite von der Leyen’s repeated assurances that the revised French proposal recognizes the Macedonian language without any qualifications or footnotes—that there is no doubt the Macedonian language is Macedonian, and that the national identity of the Macedonians is respected—the dominant discourse in the streets, the media, and on social networks remained unchanged. Slogans continued to circulate claiming that the Macedonian language is “not a footnote,” that “there are no negotiations with fascists,” that Macedonia will not become a protectorate, and, at one point, Levica supporters even brought out an improvised guillotine.
An improvised guillotine was brought to the protests in front of the Assembly in Skopje | Photo: Facebook page of the Levica political party
A Verbal War Between Two VMRO Right Wings and Levica
Analyst Žarko Trajanovski, who at the time examined the narratives opposing the constitutional amendments, notes that some of Levica’s so-called “anti-fascist” and anti-Bulgarian propaganda narratives made no effort to conceal their underlying objective: preventing North Macedonia’s accession to the European Union.
“For example, after ECRI, in its report on North Macedonia, pointed out the prevalence of a typical anti-Bulgarian stereotype and the labeling of Bulgarians as ‘fascists,’ a Levica propagandist—using rhetoric reminiscent of Russian propaganda—attacked ECRI as an EU body for the ‘rehabilitation of fascism and Nazism,’ despite the fact that it is an institution of the Council of Europe,” Trajanovski writes in his analysis.
On the other side of the border, Bulgaria had already entered a spiral of political instability, holding one parliamentary election after another with no clear outcome—except for the presidency of Rumen Radev, who secured a decisive electoral victory in 2021. Political actors there, not unlike those in North Macedonia, further fueled the flames, deepening the divisions between the two societies.
“The organized structures in Bulgaria that are conducting anti-state campaigns against North Macedonia are linked to Russian intelligence services,” President Stevo Pendarovski stated at the time, immediately after a meeting of the Security Council in early 2023, at the height of this Macedonian–Bulgarian war of words.
The offensive launched by Bulgaria’s VMRO–BND, led by Krasimir Karakachanov, resembled a game in which one side tossed a tennis ball onto the court, only for it to be routinely returned by Macedonia’s VMRO-DPMNE—much to the delight of an audience increasingly demanding sharper and harsher rhetoric. In this escalating exchange, reason was gradually pushed to the margins, a development for which responsibility also lies with actors in both countries who had previously played constructive roles in seeking compromise.
Nevertheless, the populism of Bulgaria’s VMRO–BND failed to save the government of Boyko Borissov. In the spring of 2021, Bulgaria went to elections in which Borissov and his GERB party were defeated, while Karakachanov failed to secure a single parliamentary seat and subsequently resigned. Later in 2021, a technocratic government led by Kiril Petkov came to power. Although its rhetoric was more moderate, it proved unable to fully shed the political burdens inherited from its predecessors. In the spring of 2022, the Bulgarian parliament adopted a second Framework Position, which differed little from the first and retained many of its excessive demands.
France, as the EU presidency bearing significant responsibility for the resulting turmoil and the reawakening of Balkan atavisms, became actively involved in seeking a solution to overcome the Bulgarian veto through what became known as the “French proposal.” In its initial version, a large portion of the conditions contained in the two Bulgarian Framework Positions were removed under strong diplomatic pressure on Sofia from Paris, Brussels, and Washington. Nevertheless, the Macedonian government rejected the first French proposal because it included Bulgaria’s demand for a footnote qualifying the Macedonian language in official EU usage.
North Macedonia received support for its insistence that the Macedonian language not be subject to any footnotes and that it be accepted as such—as a fact—across all linguistic atlases. On 30 June 2022, the government of Dimitar Kovačevski accepted a revised plan under which the sole condition for opening negotiating chapters after the screening process was the inclusion of the Bulgarian minority in the Macedonian Constitution. With this, the Bulgarian veto was lifted, and the EU Council adopted the Negotiating Framework for North Macedonia’s accession talks.
Within this Negotiating Framework, there is no explicit requirement to complete the work of the joint historical commission as a precondition for accession. Instead, the commission is merely encouraged to conclude its work by the time North Macedonia joins the EU—an encouragement that does not constitute a binding obligation or accession condition. Regarding the commitments arising from the 2017 Treaty of Friendship and Good-Neighbourliness and from the Protocol of the second meeting of the intergovernmental Macedonian–Bulgarian commission, EU rules stipulate that the results of the commission’s work are presented orally by Enlargement Commissioner Olivér Várhelyi to the EU Council, without a vote by member states.
As for North Macedonia’s obligations within the accession process—those whose fulfillment conditions the pace of negotiations and on which the European Commission submits written reports subject to voting in the European Council—the Negotiating Framework clearly states that the only issue subject to a formal benchmark is the implementation of the Action Plan concerning the protection of the rights of all minority groups in the country. In this context, particular emphasis is placed on hate speech, which is not limited to relations with Bulgaria but is identified as a broader sociopathological phenomenon—one with which North Macedonia faces serious challenges both in its relations with neighbors and within its own interethnic relations.
An Offensive of Disinformation Narratives
At that point, domestic populism entered the scene in Skopje in an eclectic configuration, bringing together VMRO-DPMNE, the already mobilized so-called “UDBA-linked” structures, as well as a sizable group of individuals and non-governmental organizations whose public authority had previously been built on a pro-European agenda. Acting in concert, these actors succeeded in generating broad public support for the emphatic NO to the Negotiating Framework and the Agreement, a stance that resulted in stagnation along North Macedonia’s path toward the European Union. From that moment onward, a steep decline in pro-European political sentiment set in, accompanied by an equally sharp rise in Euroscepticism—particularly among ethnic Macedonians as the majority population.
Subsequently, the German Federal Foreign Office initiated a study examining the narratives that shaped this dramatic turn of events—specifically, how an agreement that was meant to mark the beginning of Macedonia’s transformation instead contributed to its retreat into the entrenched divisions of the past.
The study was published in December 2024 by the Institute for Strategic Dialogue (ISD) in Berlin and commissioned by the German Bundestag. Its methodology relied primarily on monitoring online media, with a strong emphasis on data drawn from social networks. One of the study’s authors is Katerina Kolozova, director of the Institute of Social Sciences and Humanities (ISSH-S).
According to Kolozova, the so-called “French proposal” was deliberately presented to the Macedonian public as a behind-the-scenes initiative of the French government to resolve the Macedonian–Bulgarian dispute, rather than as what it actually was: an EU Negotiating Framework for North Macedonia.
“Yes, the proposal emerged during the French presidency, but it is a proposal of the EU Council. Incidentally, we observed that the term ‘French proposal’ is used almost exclusively within our country, and to some extent in Bulgaria, but never in Western European media, where it is referred to solely as the European Negotiating Framework,” she explains, adding that the most frequently repeated phrases in the narratives circulating at the time claimed that through the name change and the so-called French proposal, Europe was behaving ‘fascistically’ and erasing Macedonian identity, that the EU was unnecessary, and that Europe should instead be ‘brought home,’ among similar assertions.
“The ISD Berlin study in which I participated—involving PhD-level researchers in digital data and media analysis from ISD London—demonstrated that when key words associated with these narratives are entered into data-harvesting tools, more than 300,000 data points emerge. Crucially, regardless of whether civil society organizations are included in the data network or excluded from it, the narrative remains unchanged. In other words, even when their data points are removed and only right-wing actors and Levica are left, the network remains the same. This proves that regardless of whether the discourse is generated by center-right, far-right, far-left political actors, or by so-called civic organizations, both the narrative and the structure of the data remain identical,” Professor Kolozova explains.
Throughout this entire process, the uncritical stance of the media toward the numerous disinformation claims and speculative assertions surrounding the Negotiating Framework was particularly evident. A large number of outlets that present themselves as pro-European or ostensibly “neutral” persistently used the term “Bulgarian veto,” even though that veto had in fact been overcome through the so-called French proposal, after which the process became governed by a Negotiating Framework. This repeated invocation of a “Bulgarian veto” created the illusion among the public that if the EU were to change its decision-making rules and replace unanimity with qualified majority voting, the “Bulgarian veto” would simply disappear.
This offensive of disinformation, manipulation, and speculation—which profoundly distorted the public debate—was also tracked by the Institute for Media and Analysis (IMA). The institute identified numerous false claims regarding the Protocol, including assertions that it envisaged the demolition of monuments in North Macedonia not approved by Bulgaria, that archival documentation from 1945 to 1990 would be transferred wholesale to Bulgaria, or that prison sentences would be imposed for “speech” against Bulgarians.
“Independent fact-checkers have demonstrated that none of this is true, just as it is untrue that new school textbooks would require approval in Bulgaria or that Macedonia would have to apologize to Bulgaria for the persecution of Bulgarians in Macedonia by the communists. In its review of a disinformation-laden publication, Vistinomer.mk also addressed insinuations that the Protocol provides for the banning of books, films, and other works of art not approved by Bulgaria, or that all future books and films would have to receive approval from Sofia,” the IMA analysis states.
Members of the joint historical commission also came under direct attack, as the propaganda machinery sought to discredit them by portraying them as “traitors.” Notably, the volume of publications opposing the agreement intensified after a VMRO-DPMNE member familiar with the commission’s work circulated claims that Macedonian representatives had received a “political order” to approve all demands made by their Bulgarian counterparts—claims for which the promised evidence was never produced. Nevertheless, the desired effect of inflaming public sentiment was achieved through a wave of publications rife with disinformation. These publications were likewise identified in the study commissioned by the German Bundestag.
“In 2023, the trend that began in 2022 of accusing the historical commission of ‘Bulgarization’ continued. The party Levica, which in 2022 accused the commission of serving ‘Bulgarization’ and acting in the interests of supremacist Bulgarian nationalism, continued throughout 2023—through its representatives—to stigmatize the commission as an instrument of Bulgarization,” the Institute for Media and Analysis (IMA) notes.According to the institute, nearly identical propaganda networks, communication channels, and disinformation narratives concerning the alleged endangerment of Macedonian identity, language, and nation—previously deployed in 2018 during the Prespa Agreement and the referendum—were reused in 2022 in connection with the “French proposal,” and again in 2023 in relation to the constitutional amendments.
Photo: Then-opposition leader and current prime minister Hristijan Mickoski address the media in front of Parliament on 14 July 2022, following his meeting with Ursula von der Leyen | Photo: Facebook page of Hristijan Mickoski
Then-opposition leader and current prime minister Hristijan Mickoski address the media in front of Parliament on 14 July 2022, following his meeting with Ursula von der Leyen | Photo: Facebook page of Hristijan Mickoski
Broader Horizons
Shaped by this charged atmosphere, the then leader of the opposition—and today’s prime minister—Hristijan Mickoski, adopting the discourse promoted by Levica, claimed that VMRO-DPMNE was the “guardian of the Macedonian language and identity” and would not allow constitutional amendments. On 14 July, standing in front of Parliament, he announced that he had shown Ursula von der Leyen “images of the killings of young people in Vatasha, of the hero Vera Ciriviri Trena, and of the deportation of Jews carried out by the Bulgarian fascist occupier.”
“Are we now supposed to accept that they are merely administrators?! VMRO-DPMNE will not support constitutional changes!” Mickoski stressed at the time.Today, the governing coalition holds a near two-thirds majority in the Macedonian Parliament, and the shortfall of a few MPs required to adopt the constitutional amendments could be overcome without major difficulty. The question, however, is what such a move would mean for Mickoski’s political career. In the meantime, narratives asserting that Macedonian identity itself is at stake continue to dominate public discourse, accompanied by demands for guarantees that Bulgaria will not introduce new conditions during the accession process.
Media outlets on both sides of the border played a significant role in bringing the process to this political deadlock. They bear responsibility for much of what has been published on Macedonian–Bulgarian relations over the past decades. It is therefore only fair to note that the Macedonian public was routinely exposed primarily to provocative statements by fringe figures and opportunists fishing in troubled waters. Since independence, any reasonable observer would conclude that people in Macedonia know very little about what contemporary Bulgaria actually is today and about its cultural and social dynamics.
My stay in Sofia—just a few days, undertaken for the purposes of this research—opened up entirely new horizons. I encountered people who have long since moved beyond the confines of “Zhivkovism” and who today see themselves as part of a broader intellectual and cultural space commonly referred to as Europe. From them, I also learned about numerous concerts, book launches, and exhibitions by Macedonian authors that had impressed Sofia’s cultural and political elite. Regrettably, the Macedonian public has received almost no information about these events.
Over the years, I have had the privilege of meeting many Bulgarians who view Macedonia without prejudice. In this context, I recall a particularly generous initiative launched by activists from Bulgaria and Macedonia back in 2013. At the time, an online campaign emerged calling on the municipal authorities in Sofia and Skopje to agree to name a street in the Macedonian capital after Zhelyu Zhelev, and a street in Sofia after Boris Trajkovski—the first Macedonian president who resisted entrenched stigmas and who, together with his Bulgarian counterpart Petar Stoyanov, jointly commemorated a historical event that unites the two societies.
The initiative gathered nearly 5,000 signatures on social media, yet not a single media outlet deemed it worthy of support. In this context of societies living isolated from one another—not by walls, but by the fog sown by nationalists—I would like to conclude this series with the words of my close friend Lucia Popovska, who today lives in Sofia as the Executive Director of the global network of organizations Masterpeace.
“I have been living in Sofia—which is a wonderful city, rich in memories of refugees from Macedonia—for many years now. One of the first things I noticed is that before moving here, I had no idea how closely Bulgarian identity narratives are tied to Macedonia. That surprised me greatly, and I understand now that there is no way for our relations to improve unless we truly come to understand this,” Lucia says.
Through experiences like Lucia’s, or through the goodwill of those who wish to see the region defined by peace, well-being, prosperity, dialogue, and mutual understanding, we may finally begin to grasp why neither we nor Bulgaria could tolerate the first editor-in-chief of Nova Makedonija, Vasil Ivanovski, during the communist period. In doing so, we might also come to understand—both Macedonians and Bulgarians alike—what he meant as early as 1933 in his text titled “Why We Macedonians Are a Distinct Nation.” Such understanding, achieved through a mature democratic process, could well offer answers to many other questions that continue to trap Macedonian–Bulgarian relations in the vortex of Balkan atavisms.
Under the weight of history, in 2017 the governments of Macedonia and Bulgaria signed the Treaty of Friendship, Good-Neighbourliness, and Cooperation. The agreement was signed by Prime Ministers Zoran Zaev and Boyko Borissov on 1 August, and the following day, on Ilinden, the two of them—together with their government cabinets—paid tribute at the grave of Goce Delchev in Skopje. Present as well were Krasimir Karakachanov and Ekaterina Zaharieva, as well as Bujar Osmani and Nikola Dimitrov. The visit was conducted with the highest military honours, and after the joint commemoration of Delchev, Zaev stated:
“We have placed history and the past as solid foundations upon which we began building Macedonia’s Euro-Atlantic future—one that leads to a better quality of life. We listened to Delchev, who told us not to waste time. Development requires hands that are willingly extended—by citizens and by peoples who rely on and support one another, and who thus move forward together in a stable manner. We extended our hand, and hands were extended toward us. Bulgaria showed the same sense of responsibility toward our shared goals,” Zaev said in front of the Church of St. Saviour in Skopje’s Old Bazaar.
One day earlier, in the renovated government building in Skopje—with its new neoclassical façade—Borissov responded to a journalist’s question about why they had decided to celebrate Ilinden together by saying:
“Because the holidays are shared. What are we supposed to do—fight each other? We have done that many times, and everyone has been ‘Great’—Greater Bulgaria, Greater Serbia, Greater Albania, Greater Macedonia… And because of wars, we turned the Balkans into the poorest and most backward part of Europe. We want to move forward and catch up with Germany, Austria, France… This is a holiday that we also cherish. Forgive us for celebrating it,” Borissov said.
There is no doubt that the Treaty of Good-Neighbourliness was a clear demonstration of political will in both countries to enter a process of permanently resolving the issues that had burdened their relations for decades. At the time, the Macedonian government—buoyed by the international success of the Prespa Agreement—entered the Bulgarian chapter with enthusiasm which, unfortunately, was not matched by concrete results. The acclaim brought by “Prespa” led them, somewhat recklessly, to believe that their strategic partners would shield them from Bulgarian pressure.
In journalistic circles, a narrative was circulating that Bulgaria would not be able to withstand pressure from the EU and the United States. That political misjudgment, naturally, had its cost. Almost no tangible progress was achieved in implementing the Treaty of Friendship, not even in the so-called “soft” areas such as improving cooperation in tourism, education, culture, or social policy. Nor was there progress on issues such as the injustice inflicted upon one of the doyens of Macedonism, as in the case of Vasil Ivanovski, or that of ASNOM delegate Venko Markovski. Results of this kind might have secured Macedonia a stronger position in the dispute and, certainly, greater credibility in the eyes of its strategic partners.
An additional complicating factor was the complex internal political situation faced by the third government of then-Prime Minister Borissov, which was heavily dependent on smaller coalition partners united within the so-called Patriotic Front, led by Krasimir Karakachanov, president of the Bulgarian VMRO.
Goce Delchev
“It wasn’t easy for us either, dealing with nationalists in the government,” says a high-ranking official from Borissov’s government, with whom I recently had the opportunity to speak in Sofia. “There was no real implementation of the Treaty of Friendship. We felt that your side was playing games with us. Had there been any kind of meaningful step forward, things might have unfolded differently,” adds the official, who requested anonymity due to the sensitivity of the issue.
According to him, the moment when talks began to deteriorate in Macedonian-Bulgarian relations occurred in 2018, when—under pressure to produce some progress on joint commemorations—at one of the meetings of the Joint Commission on Historical Issues, the Macedonian side proposed that Sofia and Skopje jointly mark the day when the leader of the Bulgarian Communist Party and Bulgarian prime minister, Georgi Dimitrov, handed over the remains of Goce Delchev to the then Socialist Republic of Macedonia—namely, 7 October 1946.
“To celebrate Goce Delchev on that day would be the same as accepting the celebration of betrayal,” the interlocutor told us, speaking under the protection of anonymity.
This information was also confirmed by sources from the Macedonian side.
Бојко Борисов и Зоран Заев на гробот на Гоце Делчев, 2 август 2017 г. | Фото: Влада на Република Македонија
Boyko Borissov and Zoran Zaev at the grave of Goce Delchev, 2 August 2017 | Photo: Government of the Republic of North Macedonia
After this episode, bilateral relations entered a downward phase, influenced in part by the broader setback caused by France’s blockade of the EU enlargement process. While efforts were under way to address French demands for reform of the EU’s negotiating methodology, Bulgaria had already come forward with its own declaration, adopted by the Bulgarian Parliament. The document contained maximalist demands—including the denial of the Macedonian language—as conditions for Bulgaria’s green light to the start of accession negotiations with what was by then the Republic of North Macedonia.
This Bulgarian stance further discouraged the already modest efforts of the Macedonian side to implement the Treaty of Friendship, Good-Neighbourliness, and Cooperation. In the second half of 2020, Germany assumed the rotating presidency of the EU and made serious attempts to overcome the deadlock, applying exceptional pressure on both sides. In November of the same year, the foreign ministers of Macedonia and Bulgaria, Nikola Dimitrov and Ekaterina Zaharieva, were invited to Berlin, with German diplomats seeking to help broker a solution that would unblock the process.
In Berlin, the two delegations held a lengthy meeting lasting more than five hours. According to sources who were present, the atmosphere was tense, particularly during the exchanges between the two ministers. Nevertheless, that evening a conclusion—or non-paper—was reached, to which both sides agreed. This “agreement,” however, would survive for only one night. The very next day, upon her return to Sofia and after meeting with Prime Minister Boyko Borissov, Minister Zaharieva withdrew from what had been agreed.
“At the meeting in Berlin we made progress, but it was not sufficient,” Ekaterina Zaharieva stated after returning from Berlin and meeting with her superior.
Diplomatic sources explain this shift in position as the result of pressure from the United Patriots, led by Krasimir Karakachanov, who viewed the Macedonian–Bulgarian dispute as an opportunity for his political formation to craft a narrative that would help it retain its grip on power. Borissov, for his part, having avoided key reforms in Bulgaria’s judiciary and the fight against corruption—failures that had brought down his previous government, in which the Reformists had been coalition partners—became increasingly dependent on Karakachanov’s support.
Under these circumstances, Borissov chose to turn his back on the Germans—whose mediation had enabled the breakthrough in Berlin—and instead to accommodate Karakachanov, who saw in this issue a powerful catalyst for his “patriotic” narratives.
Karakachanov also benefited from the logistical and ideological legacy of “Zhivkovism,” while a role in this unfolding story was likewise claimed by both the then and current president, Rumen Radev. According to our sources in Sofia, Radev is not particularly resistant to influence from Moscow, especially in its efforts to obstruct EU enlargement in the Western Balkans. In this way, Borissov—and along with him Zaev—under the weight of multiple circumstances, lost control of the process, which subsequently fell into the grip of populism.
A Loaded Gun
“A Loaded Gun: National Populism in North Macedonia” is the title of an analysis published in April 2020, based on two studies conducted by the Foundation for Humanistic and Social Studies in Sofia. The first study covers the period from 1 February to 31 May 2019, while the second spans from 1 June 2019 to 24 January 2020. Both were carried out using an automated media monitoring and analysis system, SENSIKA.
The analysis identifies the sources of harmful narratives and disinformation that were active at the time, as well as their ideological frameworks and external influences. Up to that point, the study argues, Macedonian–Bulgarian relations had been moving toward greater rapprochement between the publics of the two countries.
According to the analysis, there are stark differences in the volume of propaganda present in the two states. As noted, in North Macedonia Russian propaganda and populist anti-Western discourse do exist, but in a relatively muted form. Criticism of the West is rarely directed explicitly at NATO or the EU, owing to the strong public and political consensus in favor of membership. Terms such as “Sorosoid” and overtly derogatory labels targeting the West are used infrequently—far less than in Bulgaria, where such narratives are considerably more widespread. Over the course of a single year, from early 2019 to early 2020, the SENSIKA system identified only 977 articles in the Macedonian language containing elements of these anti-Western narratives. By contrast, 4,244 such articles were identified in Bulgarian.
Professor Dimitar Vatsov, co-author of the analysis “A Loaded Gun: National Populism in North Macedonia” | Photo: personal archive, used with permission
Professor Dimitar Vatsov, co-author of the analysis “A Loaded Gun: National Populism in North Macedonia” | Photo: personal archive, used with permission
Among other findings, the analysis points out that harmful narratives in North Macedonian media and on social networks are often reinforced and inspired by analogous structures in Bulgaria. Their origins are largely burdened by what are referred to as “UDBA-style” or “Zhivkovist” contexts. The study also detects external, direct Russian influence.
“In Macedonia there are two marginal extra-parliamentary parties that are pro-Russian and opposed to the EU and NATO. Their names—Edinstvena Makedonija (United Macedonia) and Rodina (Fatherland)—mirror those of their Russian counterparts, and their national-populist narratives correspond to all the key elements of Russian propaganda. They are promoted by several entirely anonymous online media outlets, which have already attracted thousands of followers on Facebook. It is precisely in these areas that we can suspect direct interference from Moscow. The Russian footprint, however, remains too limited to be decisive and will grow only in symbiosis with other factors,” the study states.
Similar—and in some cases identical—narratives are also identified in Bulgaria, where Russian influence represents a more significant factor.
The convergence of narratives shaped by direct Russian influence with those that are more indigenous and traditional activates a downward spiral in which the quality of Macedonian–Bulgarian relations begins to erode. During the periods covered by the research, there was a noticeable increase in the publication of opinion columns in Macedonia authored by intellectuals who appear to have been part of the cultural elite during the socialist era.
“These intellectuals tend to have belonged to the cultural elite under socialism—poets, journalists, diplomats, and the like. Having been partially marginalized, they now position themselves as advocates of an anti-globalist restoration. Naturally, there are also younger figures among them. However, as in Bulgaria, the social downgrading of socialist-era cultural elites is one of the main drivers behind the spread of disinformation and propaganda,” the study notes.
As an illustration of this narrative, the research highlights excerpts from articles published in what remains of the former state publishing giant Nova Makedonija, now reduced to a private, significantly diminished version of the country’s first daily newspaper, which nevertheless continues to be printed.
Particularly noteworthy is the segment of the 2019 research addressing the period when Macedonia’s integration process became collateral damage of the EU enlargement blockade, following French President Emmanuel Macron’s demand for reform of the accession methodology. According to the analysis, disappointment over the blockade in Macedonian media was not expressed through hostile language toward France, but rather through criticism directed at the government in Skopje.
Professor Dimitar Vatsov, one of the authors of the study, explains that these narratives often align with Russian propaganda, which is based on criticizing Western values and disseminating disinformation about their quality, with the aim of stoking anti-European sentiment. Diverting Macedonia—and the Western Balkans as a whole—from the European integration process is one of the central objectives of Russian foreign policy, pursued through a wide array of propaganda tools and disinformation networks.
This trajectory of developments has struck at the very core of mutual misunderstanding and division in the competing portrayals of the dispute over the identity of Goce Delchev, a revolutionary hero in the official historiographies of both Bulgaria and Macedonia. In stark contrast to what is perhaps his most famous thought, the authorities in Skopje and Sofia have come to understand the world not as a space for cultural competition, but as a field in which to sow hatred and anger among peoples—harvests from which, thus far, the sole loser has been the Macedonian people.
During the period often described as the “End of History,” in line with Francis Fukuyama’s thesis—or, more precisely, the beginning of a new era of European democracies—the then Republic of Macedonia and the Republic of Bulgaria entered this phase in markedly different ways.
In Bulgaria, the transition was symbolized by the presidency of Zhelyu Zhelev, a former dissident and politically persecuted intellectual who became the country’s first democratically elected president. His leadership marked Bulgaria’s entry into a new liberal era, one that sought to break decisively with the burdens of its communist past.
Across the border, the situation unfolded differently. Macedonia emerged from the Yugoslav federation under the leadership of the Social Democrats’ so-called “young lions,” political figures who had only recently passed through the final congresses of the Communist Party.
For this new generation of leaders, however, it proved difficult to fully abandon the ideological baggage of the 1980s—a decade dominated in the region by Slobodan Milošević. Inspired by Dobrica Ćosić, Milošević revived the most aggressive forms of Serbian nationalism and hegemonic ambition. The consequences of that period continue to resonate across the former Yugoslav space, where the legacy of figures such as Tempo and Boba has repeatedly resurfaced in new political contexts.
While in Sofia, I had the opportunity to meet Stefan Tarfov, foreign policy adviser to Bulgaria’s first democratic president, Zhelyu Zhelev. Tarfov says that Bulgaria’s first democratic government closely followed developments in Macedonia at the time but remained uncertain about how to act “given the circumstances.”
“Macedonia in 1990 and 1991 was still undecided about its future within Yugoslavia,” Tarfov explains. “At the same time, Bulgaria was in a very difficult socio-economic situation. We feared Greece’s reaction and were deeply concerned by Milošević’s increasingly aggressive behavior. In 1992, it was not easy to formulate a clear position.”
According to Tarfov, in an effort to better understand the broader regional dynamics, Bulgaria sought insight from the office of French President François Mitterrand.
“President Zhelev wanted first-hand information on developments in Yugoslavia. From Paris, I was informed that [Robert] Badinter would soon announce a recommendation to recognize Macedonia. That news came as a great relief. I relayed the news to the President’s Office and then to the government in office at the time. When I shared the information, the cabinet could not hide its satisfaction. The decision was made, and Bulgaria became the first country to recognize Macedonia’s independence,” Tarfov recalls.
Zhelev’s Liberal Vision and the Clash with the Zhivkovist Matrix
Zhelyu Zhelev, a liberal intellectual and a victim of the communist regime of Todor Zhivkov, held views on the Macedonian question that ran counter to the dominant narrative. Despite strong resistance from the Bulgarian Socialist Party (BSP)—the political heirs of Zhivkovism—Zhelev sought to institutionalize these positions within Bulgaria.
“We were facing major challenges in Bulgaria’s democratization. Although we had won power, the BSP was in opposition but retained significant influence within the institutions, where many of their people were still present. On the Macedonian question, the BSP attacked us fiercely, and their nationalism was largely embraced by a public that had not yet abandoned the Zhivkovist mindset,” Tarfov explains, describing both Zhelev’s views and the obstacles confronting his policies.
For years, Moscow has skillfully influenced Bulgarian positions and promoted narratives questioning the existence of the Macedonian language and identity. This may help explain why, from Zhelev’s time onward, Bulgaria’s recognition of Macedonia as an independent state did not explicitly include recognition of the Macedonian language. Many Bulgarian politicians and intellectuals continue to insist that the Macedonian language is merely a dialect of Bulgarian and that the “Macedonian nation” is an artificial construct created by communist Yugoslavia. At the same time, it is increasingly evident that Bulgarian society itself lacks a clear consensus on this issue.In any case, such propaganda spills over into Macedonia, where it is often used as an alibi for prolonging stagnation in the country’s European integration process—arguably aligning with the strategic objectives of the Russian state with regard to Macedonia.
Македонскиот академик и писател Божин Павловски | Фото: Dzide, јавен домејн, Викимедија комонс
Macedonian academic and writer Božin Pavlovski | Photo: Dzide, public domain, Wikimedia Commons
Yet Zhelev’s stance on the language issue was radically different from the mainstream. This is confirmed by Macedonian writer Božin Pavlovski in one of his personal notes. According to Pavlovski, during Macedonia’s independence, “the great Bulgarian intellectual Zhelyu Zhelev was the first to extend a hand to the Macedonian people and to our state.”
As Pavlovski recounts, as early as 1988 he hosted Zhelev at his legendary restaurant Misla, where they agreed that Zhelev’s book Fascism would be published in the Macedonian language.
Pavlovski recalls that Zhelev made a remark that deserves to be remembered: “You often make a mistake when you say that your largest diaspora is in America or Australia. Your largest diaspora is in Bulgaria,” Zhelev said on that occasion.
Zhelev would later clearly demonstrate—on two separate occasions—his own approach, and that of the Bulgarian state at the time, toward Macedonia. During the Greek embargo and the international sanctions against Serbia, Bulgaria provided the only corridor through which Macedonia could secure oil supplies from the Black Sea.
As Tarfov recalls, this was followed by an initiative by then Serbian President Slobodan Milošević, who together with Konstantinos Mitsotakis invited Bulgarian Prime Minister Dimitar Popov to Athens to discuss the possibility of a new partition of Macedonia.
“Zhelev was categorical and forbade Popov from traveling to Athens,” Tarfov says. Finally, as Tarfov also notes, Zhelev rejected a proposal advanced by former Bulgarian communists—backed by Moscow—for the creation of a new Balkan federation that would include Macedonia. The ultimate goal, he says, was to pull Bulgaria away from its European aspirations.
“Zhelev had absolutely no issue with the existence of the Macedonian language. You know that his book was translated into Macedonian precisely to demonstrate that clearly. There were many gestures through which we sought to show readiness for a different quality of relations, despite the obstruction we faced within institutions and from an intellectual elite intoxicated by Zhivkovism,” Tarfov explains.
However, he adds, there was unfortunately no comparable response from the other side of the border.
“For example, the house in Kruševo where the Kruševo Republic was proclaimed belonged to Georgi Tomalevski, who, after the republic’s collapse, moved with his family to Sofia. He was a well-known revolutionary, yet neither his house nor his name are marked—there is only a plaque stating that the Kruševo Republic was proclaimed there,” Tarfov says, recalling the early 1990s.
The Turbulent 1990s
By the mid-1990s, the Social Democrats in Macedonia held near-absolute power. Their failure to implement reforms grounded in liberal-democratic values would later prove to be a serious weakness, ultimately costing them their hold on power.
As a journalist and correspondent for TV A1 in Brussels, where I regularly covered NATO and EU affairs, I had the opportunity to witness what could be described as a “misunderstanding” between Macedonia and the NATO administration.
Borjan Jovanovski as a correspondent and program host reporting from Brussels | Photo: Evrozum
At the time, NATO insisted on regional cooperation among the signatories of the Partnership for Peace, including Macedonia and Bulgaria.
In 1996, then Prime Minister Branko Crvenkovski traveled to Brussels for talks on this cooperation. As he informed us, his assessment was that Macedonia could not easily cooperate with Bulgaria because of numerous unresolved issues from the past.
I reported this accordingly and later attended a briefing with NATO’s spokesperson at the time, Jamie Shea. I asked for clarification—and received it.
“It’s quite simple. We are aware that you carry unresolved issues from the past, and the aim of our policy is to offer a framework of support and cooperation in areas where there are no disputes—provided that both sides genuinely seek NATO membership. By building mutual trust under our mentorship in the fields of security and defense, you will also create an atmosphere in which the more difficult issues can later be addressed more easily,” Jamie Shea explained to me.
His explanation seemed logical, and I had no further questions. I prepared a report and broadcast it in the TV A1 news. I was shocked by the level of political anxiety with which the report was received by the ruling elite at the time. I was accused of being young and inexperienced, of not understanding the situation, and was even subjected to security checks and “informal” conversations with my “colleagues” to determine who was allegedly paying me.
Stefan Tarfov, my respected interlocutor in Sofia with extensive diplomatic and intellectual experience, also shared his frustrations from that period.
He recalls that during a reception at a meeting of the Central European Initiative in Italy, then Polish Foreign Minister Bronisław Geremek wanted to introduce him to Macedonian Prime Minister Branko Crvenkovski.
“I was pleased by the opportunity, but when I met the then very young Crvenkovski, I sensed a certain defiance and a need to assert superiority in his attitude toward me, as the Bulgarian ambassador to Italy at the time,” Tarfov says.
As he adds, Geremek, speaking with his political and intellectual authority, emphasized the need for cooperation between Bulgaria and Macedonia within the framework of European integration. Crvenkovski, however, responded in a surprisingly blunt and undiplomatic manner, saying there was no need for such cooperation because Macedonia was far ahead of Bulgaria and would enter the EU much earlier.
“That conversation ended awkwardly, and I realized that he was no different from our BSP politicians back in Sofia,” Tarfov recalls.
Regrettably, Macedonia failed to make use of Zhelev and his vision for building good-neighborly relations. By the early 2000s, former communists and security service affiliates had once again regained influence within Bulgarian state institutions. Bulgaria joined NATO in March 2004 and became a full member of the European Union in 2007. This year, together with Romania, it joined the Schengen Area, and as of January 1, 2026, Bulgaria will also enter the eurozone—completing its European integration, despite the fall of yet another government and preparations for new parliamentary elections, whose number few can even keep track of anymore.
Skopje, 20 June 1944 – Four Macedonian fighters, imprisoned as political convicts, escape from the Skopje prison “Idrizovo.” One of them is the then 37-year-old Vasil Ivanovski, the man who, a few months later, would become the first editor-in-chief of the first Macedonian daily newspaper, Nova Makedonija. Despite this, his brilliant revolutionary career ultimately ends tragically. Silenced by the very ideologies he fought against, Ivanovski was erased from the collective memory of the people whose freedom he had championed. Today, his Golgotha stands as a powerful metaphor for relations between Macedonia and Bulgaria—relations burdened by the old propagandas of Serbian and Bulgarian nationalism and further inflamed by Russian geopolitical influence.
The Golgotha of Vasil Ivanovski
Фото:
Screenshot from the article by Vasil Ivanovski entitled “Why We Macedonians Are a Distinct Nation,” published in 1934 | Source: Archive of the Macedonian Academy of Sciences and Arts (MANU) on Wikipedia
Vasil Ivanovski was the first editor-in-chief of the newspaper Nova Makedonija, a position he assumed at the end of October 1944, immediately after the liberation, as part of the efforts to build Macedonian statehood. Yet today this prominent publicist and revolutionary is almost unknown to the broader public. Notably, Ivanovski is also the author of the important text “Why We, the Macedonians, Are a Separate Nation,” published in 1935, one year after he joined the United (Obedineta) VMRO in Sofia. This early, explicitly declared Macedonian national activism would mark his entire turbulent life.
In 1942, at the height of the Second World War, Ivanovski was arrested by the Bulgarian authorities and sentenced to 15 years in prison. He was initially imprisoned in Bulgaria, but was later transferred to Idrizovo near Skopje in 1943. On 20 June 1944, together with Pero Ivanovski, Dimitrija Aleksovski–Pekar, and Nikola Dimitrovski–Grcheto, he managed to escape from prison and immediately joined the partisans. As a delegate, he took part in the First Session of ASNOM, and he also became actively involved in the movement’s journalistic activities, working for the partisan newspaper Ilindenski Pat. When the first issue of Nova Makedonija—the first daily newspaper in the Macedonian language—was published on 29 October 1944, Vasil Ivanovski was appointed its first editor-in-chief. Shortly thereafter, he also became Deputy Minister of Social Policy in the first people’s government.
Ivanovski remained in his editorial post only for the first issue of Nova Makedonija. Archival sources reveal that the party leadership at the time was dissatisfied with the language and script used in that first issue, which was printed in the Macedonian language according to the then-existing orthographic norm, rather than in the strictly Serbian alphabet of Vuk Karadžić. Ivanovski was removed from his position and quietly reassigned as a deputy minister. The reason for this dismissal was never publicly announced.
After a few months, Ivanovski requested permission to return to Bulgaria. In November 1945 he moved to Sofia, where he continued working in the cultural association “Macedonian Brotherhood.” In 1949 he became a victim of the staged trial against Traicho Kostov, a Bulgarian official who had supported Macedonian national distinctiveness. Kostov was hanged, while Ivanovski was arrested and sentenced to 12 years of hard imprisonment as a “Macedonist.” He served seven years in prison and was rehabilitated only in 1956. Thereafter, although he lived in Sofia until the end of his life in 1991, his name disappeared from the Macedonian public sphere—as if it had been deliberately erased because of his opposition to the pro-Serbian policy in Macedonia after the Second World War.
Old Nationalisms in the Service of Moscow
Historians and analysts today often point out that Macedonian–Bulgarian relations are hostages to a deep conflict that has persisted since the beginning of the 20th century, when Serbian and Bulgarian nationalism clashed over Macedonia. After the Second World War, this clash intensified under the leadership of the party commissars Svetozar Vukmanović Tempo and Dobrivoje Radosavljević Boba, who, through Lazar Koliševski, enforced a harsh ideological line against anyone who did not accept the pro-Serbian discourse.
“Bulgarians–Tatars” is a well-known and still current slogan that is regularly used pejoratively in colloquial speech as well as in many texts of a propagandistic nature. Many of those who use this slogan in order to demean an entire people are unaware that it was created as early as the time of the Second Balkan War as part of official Serbian propaganda, and as such was incorporated into the educational system. Of course, today it is an anachronism in Serbia—but not here.
Поранешниот претседател Стево Пендаровски | Фото: принтскрин од видео на Antidisinfo.net
Former President Stevo Pendarovski | Photo: screenshot from a video by Antidisinfo.net
“A significant part of today’s Macedonian intellectual elite still operates within the ideological framework imposed after the Second World War by Svetozar Vukmanović–Tempo and Dobrivoje Radosavljević–Boba, the political commissars of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia who were tasked with ensuring the ideological orthodoxy of Macedonian communists at the time,” says former President Stevo Pendarovski. We spoke with him about the crisis in Macedonian–Bulgarian relations, a crisis that has effectively stalled Macedonia’s European integration process.
The Bulgarian intellectual elite, meanwhile, is no less burdened by ideological contamination—often reinforced by Russian propaganda, given the enduring pro-Russian sentiment within Bulgarian society. Professor Dimitar Atanasov explains that anti-Macedonian narratives in Bulgaria began to intensify in the 1960s, when the communist system abandoned its internationalist foundations and increasingly embraced nationalism.
“At that point, propaganda began circulating in everyday life through the figure of Momchil the Hero, a narrative designed to promote the mobilization of the population around a national cause,” historian Atanasov notes.
By 1971, the Bulgarian linguistic atlas had expanded beyond Bulgaria’s borders, and the Macedonian language was reclassified by Sofia as a ‘western’ Bulgarian dialect.
“In the 1970s, Todor Zhivkov and the entire political leadership opened a national front toward neighboring countries,” Atanasov adds.
Communist propaganda and Bulgaria’s political isolation during that period went on to shape an entire intellectual class educated within that ideological framework.
“As a consequence of this legacy, we now encounter absurd situations—such as the one in which the vice-president of the Bulgarian Academy of Sciences told the Albanian ambassador here in Sofia that Bulgaria has no interest in studying the Albanian language because a large portion of Albanians supposedly speak a Bulgarian dialect,” Atanasov says, illustrating the deep intellectual distortion produced by a propaganda matrix that shaped generations of influential public figures.
Професор Димитар Атанасов | Фото: лична архива, се користи со дозвола
Professor Dimitar Atanasov | Photo: personal archive, used with permission
Secret Informants in Politics
According to Professor Atanasov, Lyudmila Zhivkova, daughter of Todor Zhivkov, took things even further. He notes that she claimed Bulgarian culture was the foundation of world civilization and envisioned a future in which everyone would speak Bulgarian. During that period, she reportedly granted academic titles to ideologically loyal “scholars” who acted as her mouthpieces. Atanasov recounts that several of these individuals were given professorships specifically to advance Greater Bulgarian narratives.
Later, the opportunistic handling of the “Macedonian question” also drew in alleged collaborators of the Bulgarian secret police, who, following Bulgaria’s democratization, entered the political arena. One notable figure, according to Atanasov, was Krasimir Karakachanov, leader of Bulgaria’s VMRO, known by the codename “Doncho.” He reportedly worked with security services against Macedonian organizations in Bulgaria and later became a staunch opponent of Macedonia’s Euro-Atlantic integration.
It is also worth noting the historical loyalty of the Bulgarian elite to the USSR—sentiments that remain influential in certain circles today. These networks, directly or indirectly, became channels for Russian propaganda, which has been particularly active in opposing Macedonia’s integration into NATO and the EU.
A senior source from the office of former Bulgarian Prime Minister Kiril Petkov confirmed that, during critical negotiations to find a compromise to end Bulgaria’s blockade of Macedonia, Russian intelligence was actively working to undermine the process. This aligns with broader Russian messaging; for example, in 2023, the Russian ambassador to Montenegro publicly described EU enlargement in the Western Balkans as a security threat to Russia.
The story of Vasil Ivanovski is not just about injustice against one individual—it reflects the broader fate of a people struggling to define themselves on their own terms, free from the narratives imposed by others.
Each new generation in Macedonia is confronted with the same question Ivanovski posed almost a century ago: “Why are we, the Macedonians, a distinct nation?”
Today, this question is no longer asked in the prisons of Idrizovo or the courts of Sofia. Instead, it emerges in European institutions, educational curricula, and public discourse, where old ideological frameworks persist, merely adopting new language. Until these historical distortions are acknowledged and the silence that allowed them to endure is confronted, North Macedonia and Bulgaria will remain trapped in a cycle of mutual distrust.
In the shadow of the local elections in October 2025, North Macedonia, as before every election cycle, faced a phenomenon much more dangerous than the usual political rhetoric. A three-month monitoring of the online space, conducted during the period from July to September 2025, reveals a disturbing picture of a society sinking into digital trenches. What appears to be sporadic incidents on social networks, in fact represents a precisely synchronized machinery of disinformation and harmful narratives that share a single goal: to turn ethnic identity into the sole political currency, at the cost of complete destabilization of social trust.
The analysis of hundreds of viral contents shows that a very small part of the information space of the Macedonian and Albanian communities overlaps. Instead of dialogue, it seems we are witnessing two parallel monologues immersed in hatred, where each side sees itself as the victim, and the other as the threat. These narratives do not remain closed within the digital world and directly spill over onto sports fields, schoolyards, city buses, and also onto the streets, in neighborhood environments.
Ethnic Narratives and Perceptions in the Public Discourse
Visual Map of Dominant Frames and Their Effects in the Public Space of North Macedonia
#
Narrative / Theme
Macedonian Frame / Perception
Albanian Frame / Perception
Common Effect
1
Threat to sovereignty and territorial integrity
Albanians are depicted as conquerors or separatists working towards “Greater Albania” and wanting to turn Macedonia into a second Albanian state.
Macedonian elites use sovereignty rhetoric to oppress Albanians and present Macedonia as an artificial creation built on exclusion.
Fuels existential fear and positions coexistence as a zero-sum battle where one must lose for the other to gain.(zero-sum).
2
Institutional bias and double standards
State institutions, courts, and the police favor Albanians and ignore their provocations.
Undermines trust in institutions and justifies hostility toward the other group.
3
Systemic discrimination and inequality
Albanians enjoy privileges and impunity, exploiting state resources.
Albanians face structural exclusion from public life and language rights.
Reinforces the collective perception of victimhood and entrenches the feeling of injustice.
4
Cultural heritage and historical legitimacy
Albanian claims of heritage (e.g., Dardania) challenge Macedonian history and identity.
Authorities deliberately minimize Albanian cultural presence and recognition.
Transforms cultural diversity into a political competition for legitimacy and “ownership” over history.
5
Identity and belonging
Albanians reject integration, do not respect the Macedonian language, and undermine unity.
Macedonians are accused of lacking an authentic identity and using nationalism to compensate for it.
Reduces civic belonging and reinforces ethnic polarization.
6
“Us versus Them” Polarization
Albanians are outsiders exploiting the system; hostility is normalized with calls like “Albanians go to Albania”.
Albanians cooperating with Macedonians are labeled as traitors; Macedonian society is viewed as inherently anti-Albanian.
Normalizes division and turns ethnic identity into a test of loyalty.
7
Nationalism and fear-mongering
“Greater Albania” and foreign actors threaten the nation’s existence.
The Macedonian state cultivates anti-Albanian fear to maintain control.
Keeps interethnic tension alive and shifts the focus away from common civic issues.
8
Victim and persecution complex
Macedonians view themselves as under siege – politically, culturally, and demographically.
Albanians feel persecuted, insecure, and treated as second-class citizens.
The competitive cycle of victimhood sustains the politics of resentment and undermines reconciliation.
The Myth of the “Siege” to Create Fear Among Macedonians
In the Macedonian digital ecosystem, one of the dominant narratives that permeated throughout the months is the fear of losing the state and sovereignty. Albanians are often portrayed not just as fellow citizens who have different political views, but also as “conquerors” who are actively working to destroy Macedonian identity.
This narrative gained explosive dimensions in July, through the incident involving the fan group “Ballisti” of the Shkendija football club. What was essentially a midnight march of fans before a match, was framed through sensationalistic reporting as a military operation. The Bosnian online media outlet SportSport.ba, and later Macedonian online media, transmitted an extreme comment from social networks: “The end is coming for the Slav-Macedonians, Ethnic Albania, there is no other,” and placed it in headlines as if it were an official proclamation of the fan group. Such manipulation, where the marginal voice of an extremist is presented as the collective stance of an entire ethnic group, successfully activated the narrative of an “invasion” on Skopje and solidified the perception of “Albanians as aggressors” seeking domination.
This fear is also maintained through the narrative of the “privileged Albanian” who is above the law. In August, a satirical post on the Facebook page “Misija” which claimed that “a square meter in Aračinovo should cost 4,000 euros because you buy once and have no expenses until the end of your life,” went viral. Although humorous at first glance, this post deeply resonated with impatience among some Macedonians, fueling the stereotype of Albanians as citizens who do not respect laws, do not pay for electricity, and misuse state resources to the detriment of the majority. A similar effect was observed in the reaction to court decisions on murder cases, where the Instagram profile “Boemot” promoted the thesis that the judiciary applies double standards: if the perpetrator is Albanian, they drink coffee at home, and if they are Macedonian, they immediately go into detention.
The Narrative of the “Eternal Victim” for Mobilizing Albanians
On the other side of the ethnic divide, the Albanian online sphere is dominated by the narrative of systemic discrimination and state persecution. Every action taken by the institutions is interpreted not as an administrative or legal measure, but as proof of an organized plan for the de-Albanization of the state.
This narrative was heavily exploited by the ethnic Albanian political party DUI in July, which accused institutions of “ethnic cleansing” after 25 Macedonians and only one Albanian were employed in the Ministry of Defense. Although the employment falls under a legal category, Albanian language media framed this as a “systematic plan for the exclusion of Albanians” and the construction of a mono-ethnic state, which caused an avalanche of angry comments and a feeling of collective endangerment.
This feeling of insecurity is easily manipulated through disinformation. In September, social media was flooded with news that an Albanian doctor at the Children’s Clinic in Skopje was banned from speaking Albanian. Although this information was false and lacked any official confirmation, it was accepted as absolute truth because it perfectly fit into the already constructed narrative of oppression. Comments exploded with claims that “there is no institution in North Macedonia where you can speak Albanian,” further deepening distrust in the state apparatus.
Physical security is another key topic. The incident in Bitola in August, when a boy was attacked because of a T-shirt with a double-headed eagle, heightened tension between the communities. On one hand, political actors and part of the public portrayed this event as an example of a society where Albanians are treated as second-class citizens and their national symbols are seen as a threat, which led to dangerous calls for “self-defense” and revenge. On the other hand, the fan group behind the attack claims that the incident had no inter-ethnic motive and that the symbol on the T-shirt was a profound provocation for them, related to historical and local feelings of belonging and pride. This clash of perspectives shows the complexity of the topic and the risk of escalation of violence if both sides are not addressed.
The Phenomenon of “Double Standards”
The most dangerous aspect of these narratives is that both communities use the same argument to justify their radicalization or the so-called argument of “double standards”.
When the incident at the basketball game in Kumanovo occurred in August, where anti-Albanian chants were heard, the reaction on social media was instant polarization. Albanian TikTok users shared videos with comments about “returning to the gas chambers,” accusing the state leadership of enjoying the suffering of Albanians. At the same time, the Macedonian online community reacted defensively, claiming that Macedonian fans are unfairly penalized, while similar outbursts by Albanian fans (“Greater Albania,” “Ilirida”) go unpunished. This mutual accusation that “others are allowed everything, and we are allowed nothing” creates a vicious cycle where every new incident is not a reason to condemn violence, but a reason to count the sins of “ours” and “yours”.
The peak of dehumanization occurred after the incident at the youth football match in Shtip, where parents physically attacked children. Instead of condemning violence against minors, the comments on Facebook called Albanians a “savage tribe” and “Kachaks” calling for the use of “Bulgarian tactics” for expulsion. On the other hand, Albanian commentators compared the situation to Kosovo before the war, claiming that Macedonians were intentionally staging incidents. When children become the target of ethnic hatred, it is clear that the social fabric is on the verge of tearing.
From “Fact-Check” to “Reality Check”
How to escape this labyrinth of hatred? Simply checking and debunking disinformation and harmful narratives is no longer enough. This is because emotions are simply stronger than facts.
A more effective solution is the proactive use of unifying narratives that will deconstruct the logic of division. However, for this to happen, not only are the efforts of civil society organizations needed, but also concrete engagement from political actors, which evidently dominate all discourses in society. Perhaps what is most needed are leaders who will begin the path, move forward, and create a common history with the future, free of prejudice and complexes.
The first step, of course, is shifting the focus from an ethnic to a civic narrative. Contrary to the narrative that “Albanians do not pay for electricity,” journalistic stories should raise awareness that privileges in this country do not have an ethnic signifier, but perhaps first and foremost, a party and financial one. Corruption and impunity are common enemies. loopholes in the law are used by powerful people of all nationalities while poverty equally affects Macedonians in Bitola and Albanians in Aračinovo.
A second possible counter-narrative should focus on common life problems. While politicians like Ali Ahmeti and Hristijan Mickoski exchange allegories about “eagles” and “hunting dogs” , citizens breathe the same polluted air. Analyses might better remind us that neither the monument to Kjoseto nor the chants for “Greater Albania” will improve the dire state of healthcare or education.
The real division is not between those who cross themselves and those who bow down, but between those who have access to quality public services and those who are left on the margins.
