A new study by an international team of fact-checkers, led by Maldita.es, traced the path of Russian disinformation about Zelensky, his family, and those in his inner circle. The disinformation traveled from fake news portals and small YouTube channels, through X profiles (formerly Twitter), to RT and Russian embassies around the world, writes Truthmeter.mk.
Under the content-sharing agreement between Truthmeter.mk and Meta.mk, we republish the text in full below:
Since the start of Russia’s “special military operation” in neighboring Ukraine, President Volodymyr Zelensky and his family members have been and continue to be of the primary targets of disinformation campaigns. This can be seen in the sheer volume of disinformation that Truthmeter has fact-checked in the last two years. What the new extensive research led by Maldita.es (Spain) reveals is how disinformation related to Zelenskyy and his closest family literally travelled the world.
The research was implemented by experts from several continents working in the field of combating disinformation. The experts came from several organizations, including: StopFake (Ukraine), Delfi (Lithuania), Media Development Foundation (Georgia), Chequeado (Argentina), La Silla Vacía (Columbia), Animal Político (Mexico) and EsPaja (Venezuela).
The scheme starts with a post on an online media outlet or on a YouTube video
As described for the first time in the research by Darren Linville and Patrick Warren from Clemson University in South Carolina — mentioned in the Maldita and co.’s analysis— the most frequently used scheme for spreading a given piece of disinformation is as follows: a (usually barely credible) news outlet publishes an article which contains disinformation regarding Ukraine, Zelenskyy or his wife and family. Then, several profiles on different social media platforms, some with small following, often created shortly before the start of the disinformation “action” itself, share the article, citing the news outlet as a source, thus making the disinformation viral. And when they want an article or disinformation to reach a larger audience, they use RT channels or the official accounts of the Russian embassies. This further spreads the misinformation and gives it credibility among some parts of the public.
According to this scheme, when a given piece of disinformation starts spreading in, for example Ukraine, it is usually shared in neighboring countries or other countries in the region, and then translated in other languages, thus traveling around the world. This is especially easy when disinformation is translated in widely used languages such as Spanish, which is spoken by approximately 300 million people in more than twenty countries in Central and South America.
Such was the case with the disinformation about Zelenskyy purchasing a mansion from the British sovereign Charles III for $20 million. As noted in the research, the disinformation started on an obscure YouTube channel that allegedly belongs to a real estate agent, created on 4 February 2024. One month later, on 26 March 2024, it is picked up by the “news outlet” the London Crier. The initiator of this disinformation constituent is the posting of the video where the London Crier is used as the central source of their article. That same day, or the next day (it is not precisely known when the article was published), the disinformation migrates to Х (former Twitter). Three days later, the Russian Embassy in South Africa uses the article as its main source. From there, the misinformation spreads over the following weeks to Spain, Greece, Ireland, and even in North Macedonia.
Written by Matej Trojachanec
