Old nationalist myths such as “Greater Albania”, “Greater Serbia” and “Greater Greece” have long since become worn out and historically failed, especially considering the fact that Greece is already a member of the European Union. Instead of territorial expansion, European integration has become the real framework for political and economic development.
In this context, the Western Balkan countries that are not yet EU members remain trapped in mutual fears and mistrust, which further distances them from their own development path. Such narratives do not build a future, but rather maintain artificial conflicts and serve as a tool for internal political mobilization.
Hence, the key question arises: who benefits from the revival of these long-worn rhetorics at a time when more and more young people are leaving the region and seeking their future precisely in European countries?
Selective Quotation and Ethnic Mobilization in Pre-Election Discourse
In North Macedonia, this narrative is dominant due to the current political situation and represents one of the most easily combustible discourses when it comes to polarization, hate speech, and inciting interethnic tensions. Nationalist interpretations are quickly activated, especially when statements by politicians are conveyed half-heartedly, selectively, and without a broader context.
Such an example is Ali Ahmeti’s statement of September 24, 2025, in which he warned that if North Macedonia does not continue on the path to the European Union, citizens could face the choice of seeking their future in other countries, partly in Albania, partly in Bulgaria. In the same statement, Ahmeti explicitly called for not inciting hatred, emphasizing that it is not about territorial claims, but about the reality that Albania and Bulgaria are already members of the EU, which is not entirely true.
However, a significant part of the media reported this message out of context, reducing it to a sensationalist headline:
“Macedonia will be divided – some will go with Albania, others with Bulgaria”, with the statement being presented as a prediction or threat of the breakup of the state.
This narrative is often manipulated by other political actors by referring to old, contextually detached statements. One such example is the announcement by a member of parliament from the Left Party in which an old speech by Bilal Kasami is recycled, presented as a current and programmatic position.
In the announcement, Kasami is attributed with the statement “Let’s make Macedonia the second Albanian state”, without specifying the time, occasion or context, thus creating the impression that this is a current political agenda. Such selective reference to an old speech serves to artificially revive fears related to “Greater Albania” and the alleged Albanianization of Macedonian society.
Although formally denying Albanophobia, the rhetoric is filled with ethnically coded accusations, such as “neo-Albanism”, “irredentism” and “Macedonophobia”, which deepen interethnic distrust. Additionally, by drawing in VMRO-DPMNE, a polarizing political front is being constructed where the ethnic issue is used as a tool for electoral mobilization.
The culmination of the message is the alarmist thesis that with electoral support for certain parties, Macedonia will become a “second Albanian state”, which is a classic example of a disinformation narrative based on fear, selective quoting and historical revisionism, rather than real political processes.
Albania, “Greater Albania” and the Rama–Kurti rivalry
Albania as a state, especially in the last few years, has clearly not supported the project of a “Greater Albania”. For Tirana, it seems that European integration, regional stability and maintaining good relations with neighbors and international partners are a much higher priority. Albanian Prime Minister Edi Rama has made this clear in his policy: the goal is to complete negotiations with the European Union by 2027 and achieve full membership by 2030. A possible territorial expansion is not only not a priority, but would also jeopardize this European agenda and return Albania to the old nationalist and conflict narratives of the Balkans.
In addition, the relationship between Edi Rama and the Prime Minister of Kosovo, Albin Kurti, reflects the complex dynamics of Albanian politics in the Balkans. Rama positions himself as a pragmatic leader, focused on stability and European integration, while Kurti acts more sharply, with an emphasis on Kosovo’s sovereignty. Their rivalry is also reflected in domestic politics, creating cross-border polarization and making it difficult to harmonize government policies. Despite their common ethnic basis, the conflict shows that Albania and Kosovo are not always harmonious in their priorities, emphasizing the need for dialogue and compromise.
The “Greater Albania” narrative also conflicts with Kosovo’s diplomatic goals because it undermines sovereignty, territorial integrity, and multiethnic coexistence as prerequisites for international recognition and European integration.
Kosovo’s primary goal is full international recognition as an independent and sovereign state and membership in international organizations, including the UN. The pursuit of unification with Albania would suggest that Kosovo’s current statehood is only a secondary or temporary goal, potentially lending credibility to arguments against its independent legitimacy and playing into the hands of countries like Serbia and Russia that dispute its existence.
Journalist and head of the anti-disinformation program, Fitim Gashi, from Sbunker, points out that the topic remains sensitive and affects the balance between national symbolic goals and Kosovo’s real diplomatic needs.
“However, the main political leadership of Kosovo generally avoids officially supporting the Greater Albania project for various reasons. Official positions from both Kosovo and Albania claim that true “national unification” will be achieved through the process of both countries’ accession to the European Union, where borders within the Union become less significant. This approach is considered a safer and less complicated path than territorial changes,” says Gashi.
While the “Greater Albania” narrative is often used for internal political mobilization and serves specific political agendas, the reality is quite different. The countries of the Western Balkans, including Albania, Kosovo and North Macedonia, are aiming for European integration as the main path for stability, development and regional cooperation.
Bojana Zorić, a policy analyst at the European Union Institute for Security Studies (EUISS), emphasizes that all narratives that undermine regional stability or question existing borders are fundamentally incompatible with the EU integration process.
“EU institutions and leaders have consistently stressed that the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all enlargement partners must be fully respected and that any rhetoric or actions that challenge these principles are unacceptable. In addition, the EU has consistently stressed that good neighbourly relations in the Western Balkans are at the heart of accession. Therefore, continued efforts to foster regional trust, maintain stability and avoid divisive or revisionist narratives are essential for Albania – as they are for all Western Balkan partners – as they progress on the path to EU accession,” says Zorić.
The Balkans are in a complex position where foreign policy influences and internal vulnerabilities are intertwined. History and geopolitical configuration make the region vulnerable to external pressures and the interests of great powers, while internal problems such as corruption, weak institutional capacity, nationalism and mistrust between ethnic communities often deepen conflicts and hinder economic and political stability.
In other words, the Balkans often suffer from external manipulation, but at the same time they create their own limitations through disagreements, old nationalist myths and policies that are not oriented towards results and regional cooperation.
The Balkans need a policy that is not based on nationalism and fear, but on concrete results and economic development. Political points should be achieved by improving living standards, creating jobs, modernizing infrastructure and tackling systemic problems such as unemployment, corruption and weak regional cooperation. European integration and cooperation between neighbors offer a realistic framework for addressing these challenges and building a stable, prosperous and trusting society, where nationalism and fear are no longer tools for political mobilization. The Balkans need to get out of the victim mentality and focus on the future, instead of being tied to worn-out nationalist myths.
Written by: Despina Kovachevska
